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Abstract
This Note argues that the Korea SOFA illustrates how the current approach to implementing
SOFA agreements hinder state parties from complying with their legal obligations under article 2
of the ICCPR. Part I first provides an overview of the two competing bodies of international law at
issue: the law governing the U.S. approach to foreign criminal jurisdiction, on the one hand, and
the development of human rights law and the terms of article 2 of the ICCPR, on the other. Part II
assesses the incompatibility between ICCPR and SOFA obligations from the point of view of both
receiving and sending states–from the perspective of the ROK and the United States, respectively.
Part III rounds out the discussion with recommendations for how both the ROK and the United
States can harmonize the implementation of the Korea SOFA with their obligations under the
ICCPR. Finally, this Note concludes with some general points on the importance of reconciling
this conflict of obligations, and the larger implications for the viability and the legitimacy of U.S.
military operations overseas.

NOTE
BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE:
TENSIONS BETWEEN THE U.S.-ROK STATUS OF
FORCES AGREEMENT AND THE DUTY TO
ENSURE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE
ICCPR
Rijie Ernie Gao*
"[Sled quis custodiet ipsos custodes ?"
-Juvenal t
INTRODUCTION
On November 27, 2008, a slim majority of the Iraqi
Parliament ratified a Status of Forces Agreement ("SOFA") with
the United States. 2 The Iraq SOFA, which authorizes the
* J.D., 2009, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2005, New York University. I
wish to thank Professor Martin Flaherty for his invaluable guidance, and Liz Shura for
her thoughtful comments, during the drafting of this Note. Special thanks are also due
to my parents, and to Annie Chen, for leading me out of the Kalkwerk. I acknowledge
her support with great pleasure. All remaining defects are mine alone.
1. DECIMUS JUNIUS JUVENAL, SATIRES, bk. VI, 11. 347-48, in JUVENAL AND PERSIUS
110 (G.G. Ramsay ed. & trans., 1965). This phrase translates from the Latin: "But who
will guard the guardians themselves?" See id. at 111; see also Leonid Hurwicz, But Who
Will Guard the Guardians?, Nobel Prize Lecture (Dec. 8, 2007), available at
http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/laureates/2007/hurwicz-lecture.pdf.
2. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on
the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their
Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008
at
https://www.mnf-iraq.com/images/
available
SOFA],
Iraq
[hereinafter
CGsMessages/security-agreement.pdf (entered into force Jan. 1, 2009). Without the
Iraq Status of Forces Agreement ("SOFA"), U.S. forces could not legally remain in Iraq
after the expiration of their United Nations ("U.N.") chapter VII mandate at the end of
2008. See Greg Bruno, Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Security Agreements and Iraq
(Dec. 23, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/publication/16448 (stating that negotiations for
the Iraq SOFA were initiated to replace the UN mandate); see also Alissa Rubin &
Campbell Robertson, IraqBacks Deal That Sets End of U.S. Role, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2008,
at Al (reporting that the U.N. mandate which governs U.S. troops in Iraq expires on
January 1, 2009).

586

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 33:585

continued U.S. military presence and governs the legal status of
U.S. forces in Iraq, went into effect on January 1, 2009. 3 The
agreement drew plenty of attention for establishing a timeline for
the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31,
2011.4
Parliamentary ratification of the Iraq SOFA, however, was
preconditioned on approval in a popular referendum. 5 Were the
Iraqi people to reject the Iraq SOFA, U.S. forces would have to
withdraw within a year of the referendum. 6 Although the
referendum was originally scheduled for July 2009, the Iraqi
government has postponed it indefinitely, 7 and the likelihood of
it ever being held is uncertain. 8 Fears that the Iraqi parliamentary
3. Iraq SOFA, supra note 2, art. 30.
4. See id. art. 24.
5. See Rania Abouzeid, Iraq Approves Long-Debated US Security Pact, TIME, Nov. 27,
2008, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1862660,00.html
(stating that
the Iraq SOFA was conditioned on the July 30, 2009, referendum); see also Iraqi
Parliament Backs US Pullout, BBC, Nov. 27, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle_east/7752580.stm (reporting that the Iraq SOFA was passed on condition that a
referendum is held on the pact in the middle of 2009).
6. See Aseel Kami & Mohammed Abbas, Iraq Cabinet Approves Vote on U.S. Security
Pact,
REUTERS,
Aug.
17,
2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE57G2AC20090817 (reporting that all U.S. forces would have to leave Iraq
within one year of the vote were the referendum to fail); Timothy Williams & Abeer
Mohammed, Explosions in Iraqi PoliticalOffice Kill At Least 5, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2009, at
A6 (same).
7. See Alissa J. Rubin, Iraq Moves Ahead With Vote on U.S. Security Pact, N.Y. TIMES,
Jun. 9, 2009, at A13 (reporting that the Iraqi cabinet wished to delay the referendum to
coincide with the January 2010 national elections, and that U.S. diplomats had been
quietly lobbying for the referendum to be canceled). When July 2009 passed without a
referendum, Prime Minister Maliki announced that the vote would be held in
conjunction with the national elections scheduled on January 16, 2010. See Kami &
Abbas, supra note 6 (stating that the referendum was supposed to be held in July 2009
but had been rescheduled to coincide with the parliamentary polls); see also Ernesto
Londofio, Iraq May Hold Vote on U.S. Withdrawal, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2009, at Al
(noting the uncertainty as to whether Iraqi lawmakers will approve Maliki's initiative to
hold the referendum).
8. See Gina Chon, Iraq Vote on PulloutPut on Back Burner,WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2009,
at A14 (noting that Iraqi politicians seem unlikely to push through the referendum in
January 2010 and that it will either be delayed again or canceled). In November 2009,
the fate of the national elections scheduled for January 16, 2010 were cast into doubt,
until Iraqi lawmakers managed to pass a long-delayed election law that allowed
preparations for the January elections to proceed. See Gina Chon, Iraq Passes Key Election
Law and Preparesfor January Vote, WALL ST.J., Nov. 9, 2009, at A14 (reporting that Iraqi
lawmakers said that the delays in passing the election law could push the elections back
to January 23, 2010, instead of January 16, 2010). A string of bombings and political
turmoil in December 2009 and January 2010 derailed preparations for the election,
however, and Iraqis finally went to the polls on March 7, 2010, amid insurgent bombings
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elections of March 7, 2010, would re-ignite sectarian violence
prompted consideration of amending the Iraq SOFA to prolong
the U.S. military presence.' No referendum has yet been held,
and no plan exists for so doing.
Should the referendum take place, its outcome will turn on
how the implementation of the Iraq SOFA and its impact on the
local population. The agreement has stirred controversy over
criminal jurisdiction over U.S. forces in Iraq.") After a September
2007 daytime shootout in Baghdad by members of the private
security firm Blackwater left seventeen dead, Iraqi lawmakers
were adamant during SOFA negotiations that U.S. soldiers and
contractors should be answerable to Iraqi law." Protracted
negotiations gave Iraq primary jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers and
civilians, but only for "grave premeditated felonies" committed
while off-duty and outside U.S. installations.12 The right to

and mortar attacks. See Steven Lee Myers, Iraqis Defy Blasts in Strong Turnout for Pivotal
Election, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2010, at Al (reporting high poll turnout for the Iraqi
parliamentary elections on March 7, 2010, undeterred by concerted insurgent attacks
designed to disrupt the election); Anthony Shadid &John Leland, Baghdad Blasts Shatter
Sense of Security in Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, at A10 (reporting that hotels
intended to house observers of the March 7, 2010, elections were the targets of fatal
bombings on Jan. 25, 2010); Steven Lee Myers & Marc Santora, Election Date Set in Iraq as
Bombs Kill Scores, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2009, at A6 (reporting a series of car bombings that
occurred as Iraqi lawmakers agreed on a March 2010 date for the national elections).
9. See Helene Cooper & Mark Landler, U.S. FearsElection Strife in Iraq Could Affect
Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2010, at A14 (reporting the concern of U.S. officials that the
elections could trigger violence that would complicate the planned withdrawal, and that
contingency plans have been drawn up to keep combat troops in Iraq beyond the SOFA
withdrawal timeframe); Thomas E. Ricks, Extending Our Stay In Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,
2010, at A27 (arguing that America should extend its military presence in Iraq to
stabilize the country, and that the Iraqis should take the first step to re-negotiate the
withdrawal plan in the Iraq SOFA).
10. See Thom Shanker & Steven Lee Meyers, U.S. Makes FirmerCommitment to Pullout
Date in Draft of Iraq Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2008, at A5 (reporting that American
negotiators for the Iraq SOFA bowed to Iraqi anger over civilian deaths in shootings by
private security contractors); Mary Beth Sheridan & Karen DeYoung, U.S., Iraqi Officials
Question Terms of Draft Security Deal, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2008, at AJO (reporting that
criminal jurisdiction over troops was at issue and Iraqi politicians had strong reservations
about the agreement because it did not sufficiently guarantee Iraqi sovereignty).
11. See Charlie Savage, Judge Drops Charges From Blackwater Deaths In Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, at Al (stating that the mass shooting led Iraq to insist on the
elimination of immunity for American contractors in the Iraq SOFA); Mike Carter, Iraq
Killing Headed for Court, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009, at BI (stating that the Blackwater
shooting and other incidents were an issue during negotiations for the Iraq SOFA).
12. Iraq SOFA, supra note 2, art. 12, § 1.
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determine whether the offence occurred on-duty, however, is
13
reserved exclusively to the United States.
The controversy over criminal jurisdiction in the Iraq SOFA
is not new. 14 The United States is the foremost sending state in
the world, and is a party to over a hundred SOFAs,1 5 with
receiving states such as the members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization ("NATO"), 16 Japan, 17 and the Republic of Korea
("ROK"). 18 Crimes committed by U.S. soldiers deployed overseas
are a feature of the global U.S. military presence that produces
resentment and ambivalence in many host communities. During
negotiations for the Iraq SOFA, the Iraqi government sent teams
abroad to study the long-term impact of SOFAS elsewhere,
including in the ROK. 19 The ROK was an obvious choice for the
Iraqis, because many of the same criminal jurisdiction issues that
the Iraqis consider an affront to their sovereignty have already

13. Id. art. 12, § 9. The Iraqis may only request a review of such a determination at
the joint ministerial level. Id. art. 23.
14. See Bruno, supra note 2 (discussing the controversy and friction caused by
SOFA provisions immunizing U.S. soldiers from local prosecution in host nations such
as East Timor and Japan). In 1941, the United States and the United Kingdom entered
into an agreement with terms similar to current SOFAs, and since then the United States
has entered into SOFAs with nations such as Afghanistan, East Timor, Germany, Japan,
the Republic of Korea ("ROK"), Turkey and, most recently, Iraq. See R. CHUCK MASON,
U.S. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUS OF FORCE AGREEMENT (SOFA): WHAT IS IT, AND

How HAS IT BEEN UTILIZED? 7-17, 22, CRS No. RL34531 (Jun. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34531.pdf (tracing the historical development of
SOFAS in various nations and across different periods).
15. See id. at 1. The exact number of SOFAS that the United States has entered is
difficult to ascertain because at least ten of these agreements remain classified. See id. at
1 n.2.
16. Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter NATO
SOFA].
17. Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
Between the United States of America andJapan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the
Statue of United States Armed Forces in Japan, U.S.-Japan,Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1652.
18. Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Republic of Korea, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the
Status of United States Forces in the Republic of Korea, U.S.-S. Korea, July 9, 1966, 17
U.S.T. 1677 [hereinafter Korea SOFA].
19. See Leo Shane III, Iraq SOFA Negotiations Loom Large, STARS & STRIPES, June 22,
2008, http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=55709
(reporting that
Iraqi SOFA negotiators visited Turkey, Germany, the ROK, and Japan); Adrian Croft,
Iraq Sends Teams to Study Other U.S. Military Pacts, REUTERS, Jun. 1, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL0113546120080601 (same).
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been encountered numerous times over the course of the more
20
than half-century long U.S.-ROK alliance.
Since its conclusion in 1966, the Korea SOFA has governed
2
the legal status of U.S. military personnel stationed in the ROK 1
Criminal jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers has been a source of
strain for the two allies, most notably in 2002 when violent public
demonstrations erupted after a U.S. military jury acquitted two
U.S. soldiers, who had run over two young Korean girls while
operating their armored minesweeper vehicle, of negligent
homicide.2 2 Incidents of misconduct where U.S. personnel
receive little or no punishment fuel the charge that the Korea
SOFA perpetuates a skewed allocation of criminal jurisdiction
favorable to the United States, which, for the most part,
23
immunizes U.S. forces from Korean prosecution.
Agreements like the Korea SOFA are bilateral arrangements
under which one state agrees to surrender some part of its
sovereignty to prosecute certain categories of offenses against
their domestic law, thereby immunizing the visiting troops of
another state. 24 Under conventional rules of international law, a
waiver of jurisdiction or a grant of immunity between sovereign
nations is limited only by principles of reciprocity.2 5 On the other
hand, the ROK is also a party to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR").26 Pursuant to article 2 of the
20. See Ian S. Wexler, A Comfortable SOFA: The Need for an Equitable Foreign Criminal
JurisdictionAgreement with Iraq,56 NAVAL L. REV. 43, 52-53 (2008).
21. See Korea SOFA, supra note 18.
22. See infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
23. See Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, CriminalJurisdiction Under the U.S-Korea Status of Force
Agreement: Problems to Proposals, 13 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 213, 218 (2003)
(arguing that the Korea SOFA prevents the ROK from prosecuting U.S. soldiers in all
but the most dire situations).
24. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity:
The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 169 (1986) ("[A] state's ability to
grant or deny immunity is generally restrained only by considerations of reciprocity, that
is, how other states will, in turn, treat its alien in their territory.").
26. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S.TREATY
DOc. No. 95-20 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The ROK ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") on April 10, 1990, by
accession, without any reservations, understandings, or declarations with regard to
article 2. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties: Chapter IV Human Rights, 4.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Declarations and Reservations,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg.no=IV4&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
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ICCPR, state parties undertake "to respect and to ensure" the
rights of individuals recognized in the ICCPR, 27 and to guarantee
that those rights will receive the full protection of their domestic
28
legal system.
By surrendering jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers to the United
States, the ROK relinquishes the ability to prosecute them for
offenses against Korean law; as a result, individuals who are
victims of such offenses no longer enjoy the full protection of the
ROK's domestic legal system. 29 SOFA provisions become
incompatible with the ROK's ICCPR obligations when the United
States subsequently fails to take appropriate measures to
investigate allegations of wrongdoing, or to bring the
perpetrators to justice. It is this tension-between the legal order
represented by human rights treaties, and the contractual nature
of classical public international law expressed in SOFAs-that
animates this Note.
As the negotiations over the Iraq SOFA demonstrate, the
issue of criminal jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers overseas continues
to have currency. With U.S. military operations currently ongoing
in both Afghanistan and Iraq, this issue deserves scrutiny from a
human rights standpoint. Using the Korea SOFA as a case study,
this inquiry is motivated by one principal question: are SOFAs,
which carve out the receiving state's jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes committed by U.S. personnel, consistent with a receiving
state's obligation under the ICCPR to guarantee an effective legal
remedy for all offenses against domestic law?
This Note argues that the Korea SOFA illustrates how the
current approach to implementing SOFA agreements hinder
state parties from complying with their legal obligations under
article 2 of the ICCPR. By revealing the tensions in the ROK's
treaty obligations, the analysis also probes U.S. obligations under
article 2 as they apply extraterritorially, and considers how such
obligations should influence the implementation of the Korea
SOFA. The potential for conflict between the Korea SOFA and
the ICCPR has wider ramifications not only for the United States,
27. ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 2(1).
28. See id. art. 2(3) (a) (establishing that state parties must provide "an effective
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity") (emphasis added).
29. See infra Part I.C.3.
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but also for other receiving states that have ratified the ICCPR,
30
such as Iraq.
Part I first provides an overview of the two competing bodies
of international law at issue: the law governing the U.S. approach
to foreign criminal jurisdiction, on the one hand, and the
development of human rights law and the terms of article 2 of
the ICCPR, on the other. Part I then lays out the relevant
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the Korea SOFA and the
problems with its implementation before discussing how these
problems demonstrate the incompatible obligations faced by
state parties to the ICCPR as a result SOFA framework of criminal
jurisdiction. Part II assesses the incompatibility between ICCPR
and SOFA obligations from the point of view of both receiving
and sending states-from the perspective of the ROK and the
United States, respectively. It discusses various models for
resolving treaty conflicts in human rights treaties from the point
of view of the ROK, before turning to the issue of U.S.
obligations under the ICCPR regarding the actions of its forces
abroad. Part III rounds out the discussion with recommendations
for how both the ROK and the United States can harmonize the
implementation of the Korea SOFA with their obligations under
the ICCPR. Finally, this Note concludes with some general points
on the importance of reconciling this conflict of obligations, and
the larger implications for the viability and the legitimacy of U.S.
military operations overseas.
I. THOSE "S"WORDS, 31 SOFA AND SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPETING DEMANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LA W
SOFAs and human rights law represent two distinct bodies
of international law that apply to states in the international
system. Both are legal regimes of relatively recent vintage, having
come of age in the immediate aftermath of World War 11.32 Due
30. The United States ratified the ICCPR on June 8, 1992, but filed an
understanding that the nondiscrimination guarantees of both article 2 and article 26 are
subject to the standards of the U.S. Constitution. See U.N. Treaty Collection, supra note
26 (recording U.S. reservation that distinctions are permitted when "rationally related to
a legitimate governmental objective"). Iraq ratified the ICCPR on January 25, 1971,
without any reservations, declarations or understandings with regard to article 2. See id.
31. Louis Henkin, That "S"Word: Sovereignty, And Globalization,And Human Rights,
Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1999).
32. See infra notes 40-43, 83-85 and accompanying text.
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to the breadth and complexity of the legal issues, this discussion
is not meant to be comprehensive, and only the most pertinent
aspects of each body of international law are treated. Because the
Korea SOFA is only one of many similar agreements that the
United States has concluded with other receiving states, Part L.A
provides the larger context by tracing the development of the
NATO SOFA as a paradigm, and discusses the general U.S. policy
of maximizing its jurisdiction over its military personnel with
other receiving states. Part I.B turns to the development of an
entirely different strain of international law, human rights law,
and offers an overview of the key provisions of the ICCPR that
are relevant to this discussion. Part I.C discusses the terms of the
Korea SOFA while developing a case study of the problems and
issues that have surrounded criminal jurisdiction under the
Korea SOFA, with attention paid to how it conflicts with state
obligations under the ICCPR.
A.

The U.S. Approach to Foreign CriminalJurisdiction

Since the end of the second World War, when the United
States bases soldiers overseas, it will typically negotiate a SOFA
with the receiving nation.33 Of the myriad of legal issues these
deployments raise, criminal jurisdiction is the most commonly
addressed issue in a SOFA.3 4 The paradigm for these bilateral
agreements is the NATO SOFA, which allocates criminal
jurisdiction between the sending and receiving states with respect
35
to the competing claims of sovereignty between the two states.
33. See Steven J. Lepper, A Primer on Foreign CriminalJurisdiction, 37 A.F. L. REV.
169, 171-72 (1994) ("The United States generally concludes SOFAs with nations in
which it maintains a relatively large military presence."); Wexler, supra note 20, at 52-53
(stating that the United States and the host nation usually enter into a formal SOFA
when U.S. troops are permanently stationed or visit regularly).
34. See Mason, supra note 14, at 3 (stating that the issue most commonly addressed
in a SOFA is the protection of U.S. personnel from foreign prosecution). SOFAs follow
no fixed format, but include similar terms on the pertinent issues. Id. (noting that a
SOFA has no formal requirements and will vary in length and terms); John W. Egan,
Comment, The Futureof CriminalJurisdiction Over the Deployed American Soldier: Four Major
Trends in Bilateral United States Status of Forces Agreements, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REV 291, 293
(2006) (listing typical SOFA provisions regarding military use of land, customs and tax
issues, and criminal jurisdiction).
35. See NATO SOFA, supra note 16, art. VII; see also Youngjin Jung & Jun-Shik
Hwang, Where Does Inequality Come From? An Analysis of the Korea-United States Status of
Forces Agreement, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1103, 1116 (2003) (noting that the NATO
SOFA is the global standard for other SOFAs and it serves as a criterion for the critics of
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Because the NATO SOFA is currently the benchmark by which
other states evaluate their SOFAS, a brief discussion of the history
of foreign criminal jurisdiction and the development of the
NATO SOFA's criminal jurisdiction provisions will help to situate
the Korea SOFA in its greater context.
1. Development of the Current SOFA Framework: NATO SOFA
as a Paradigm
SOFA provisions on criminal jurisdiction often provoke
controversy because, under customary international law ("CIL"),
states have exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes on their territory,
36
whether committed by citizens or foreign nationals.
Nonetheless, prior to the development of SOFAS, the United
States asserted, as its prerogative, full sovereign immunity over its
forces overseas-a doctrine that came to be known as the law of
the flag. 37 Under the law of the flag, the presumption for
exercising jurisdiction was against the receiving state; absent an
the Korea SOFA); Lepper, supra note 33, at 172 (stating that NATO SOFA has become
"the paradigm for similar agreements" and "is still the blueprint for all other U.S. status
agreements worldwide").
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 20 (1965); see also Lepper, supra note 33, at 171 (stating that without a SOFA
international law recognized the receiving state's sovereign right to exercise jurisdiction
over U.S. troops stationed within its borders). Historically speaking, however, where
foreign troops are concerned, customary international law ("CIL") was less clear on
their status. Prior to the development of SOFAs, the prevailing school of thought was
that territorial jurisdiction should be substantially limited with regard to representatives
of a foreign sovereign. The most famous articulation of this principle is by ChiefJustice
Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.)
116, 136 (1812) ("The jurisdiction of [a] nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any
restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution
of its sovereignty."); see also Lepper, supra note 33, at 170 (stating that Chief justice
Marshall was one of the first commentators on foreign criminal jurisdiction over military
personnel). Schooner Exchange concerned a vessel that the French Navy seized and
pressed into service during the Napoleonic wars. Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) at
117. When the ship sailed into Philadelphia for repairs, its American owners sued to
recover it. I& Chief Justice Marshall dismissed the suit, reasoning that visiting military
forces, as representatives of a foreign sovereign, should be immunized from territorial
jurisdiction and that as a practical matter, commanders must have exclusive authority to
discipline their troops. Id. at 139-40 ("The grant of a free passage therefore implies a
waver (sic) of all jurisdiction over the troops during their passage, and permits the
foreign general to use that discipline, and to inflict those punishments which the
government of his army may require.").
37. Lepper, supra note 33, at 171 (equating U.S. practices with regard to criminal
jurisdiction overseas with the concept of the law of the flag).
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agreement to the contrary, the presence of foreign troops
constituted an implied waiver of jurisdiction. 8 From the
nineteenth century until World War II, the United States and
other nations justified the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over
39
their military forces overseas on the basis of the law of the flag.
After World War II, the U.S. strategy of "containment"
envisioned immense numbers of troops stationed as a barrier.
around the former Soviet Union, China, and their satellites
states.40 As the Cold War began to chill the euphoria of victory,
the United States faced the prospect of maintaining standing
armies in permanent bases around the world during peacetime. 41 Because of the challenges to the law of the flag posed by
both the rising tides of nationalism and the increasingly complex
logistics of semi-permanent bases, the SOFA was adopted to
clarify and stabilize the legal status of U.S. forces abroad. 42 The
importance of NATO to the success of the containment strategy,
coupled with resistance from the NATO states on the law of the
flag, led the United States to retreat from its insistence on
exclusive jurisdiction over U.S. troops during negotiations for a
SOFA. 4 3

38. See id. (stating that CIL had evolved to the point where mere license for foreign
troops to enter was an implied waiver of territorial sovereignty).
39. See id. (perceiving that the law of the flag was U.S. policy for 150 years and was
also embraced by other nations); Wexler, supra note 20, at 55 (stating that United States
adhered strictly to the law of the flag during both World Wars).
40. See ANNI P. BAKER, AMERICAN SOLDIERS OVERSEAS: THE GLOBAL MILITARY
PRESENCE 47-53 (2004) (discussing the U.S. strategy of containment after World War
II).
41. See Wexler, supra note 20, at 55 (stating that large numbers of U.S. troops were
permanently stationed in Europe during the Cold War out of strategic necessity); Egan,
supra note 34, at 297 (noting that the NATO treaty envisioned a "near-permanent
stationing" of troops to stem a possible Soviet invasion).
42. SeeJung & Hwang, supranote 35, at 1114 (stating that the uncertainties of legal
status for visiting forces in this period prompted the formal development of SOFAs);
Lepper, supra note 33, at 171 (World War II was "high-water mark" for the law of the
flag and it could not be sustained as nations became increasingly protective of their
sovereignty); Egan, supra note 34, at 296 (noting that the growth in national sovereignty
and the unique Cold War situation were both factors leading to development of shared
jurisdiction in the NATO SOFA).
43. See Comment, Due Process Challenge to the Korean Status Of Forces Agreement, 57
GEO. L.J. 1097, 1097 n.5 (1968) (stating that many U.S. Senators believed that United
States should have exclusive jurisdiction under international law); Lepper, supra note
33, at 171 (same).
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With the ratification of the NATO SOFA in 1953, foreign
jurisdiction over U.S. military forces became possible for the first
time. 44 The NATO SOFA established a framework of exclusive
and concurrent jurisdiction for determining whether the
receiving state or the sending state may assert jurisdiction over
the actions of U.S. soldiers. 45 When a U.S. soldier violates the law
of one state, but not the other, that state will have exclusive
jurisdiction to prosecute the offense. 46 When the law of both
47
states has been violated, "a system of priorities is established,"
according to which the sending state will have the primary right
to exercise jurisdiction over its personnel for offenses that arise
out of "official duty" or that affect only its property, personnel or
security. 48 For cases that are of "particular importance" to either
party, a waiver of jurisdiction may be requested; the other party is
not obligated to grant the request, only to pay "sympathetic
49
consideration.
The old position advocated by the United States-that states
ceded their territorial sovereignty when they permitted foreign
troops to visit-faded with the entry into force of the NATO
SOFA. 50 Although the NATO SOFA has become a common point
of reference for other states in SOFA negotiations, it remains to
this day the only multilateral SOFA,5 ' and is the only SOFA that is
completely reciprocal on the part of the United States. 52 All other
44. See NATO SOFA, supra note 16, art. VII (governing jurisdiction); cf. Lepper,
supra note 33, at 171 (stating that with the NATO SOFA the United States "signaled the
end of its insistence that its troops abroad be subject only to its criminal jurisdiction").
45. See NATO SOFA, supra note 16, art. VII (allocating criminal jurisdiction over
visiting military personnel between the sending state and the receiving state according to
the nature of the offense).
46. See id., art. VII (2) (a)-(2) (b).
47. Paul J. Conderman, Jurisdiction, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF VISITING
FORCES 99, 103 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2001).
48. NATO SOFA, supranote 16, art. VII (3) (a) (ii).
49. Id. at art. VII (3) (c).
50. See Wexler, supra note 20, at 56 (stating that the NATO SOFA marked a
"significant doctrinal shift from the 'law of the flag'" (citing Lepper, supa note 32 at
171)); see also Lepper, supra note 33 at 171 (commenting that the "concept of exclusive
receiving state jurisdiction represented a complete reversal of traditional doctrine" and
that the NATO SOFA was seen as a way to preserve some degree of sending state
jurisdiction).
51. See Mason, supra note 14, at 1 (stating that SOFAs are specific to an individual
country and that the multilateral NATO SOFA is the lone exception to the norm).
52. See Richard J. Erickson, Status of Forces Agreements: A Sharing of Sovereign
Prerogative, 37 A.F. L. Rev. 137, 140 (1994) (observing that NATO SOFA is the only
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SOFAs to which the United States is a party have been concluded
as bilateral agreements and, for the purposes of U.S. law alone,
53
are treated as executive agreements.
It is a widely accepted principle of current CIL that absent a
specific and express agreement, the doctrine of territorial
sovereignty will govern. 54 By signing a SOFA, the receiving state
surrenders some part of its sovereignty, because it would
otherwise have exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute any crime or
offense committed within its territory.5 5 From a foreign relations
perspective, SOFAS are a compromise between the competing
concerns of the parties: the sending state's interests in
maintaining command and discipline over its own troops, and
the receiving state's prerogative to punish an offense against its
laws. 56 As the next section demonstrates, however, SOFAs have
not prevented the United States from extending the scope of
immunities for its forces to the greatest possible limit.

reciprocal SOFA); Donald A. Timm, Visiting Forces in Korea, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF VISITING FORCES 443, 450 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2001) ("Like all SOFAs other than
the NATO SOFA, the [Korea SOFA] is not fully reciprocal.").
53. See Mason, supra note 14, at 1 & n.4 (noting the distinction between executive
agreements and treaties in U.S. law and the implications for SOFAs); see also Erickson,
supra note 52, at 152 nn.45-46 (discussing factors under U.S. law determinative of
whether a SOFA should be concluded as a treaty or executive agreement, including
whether reciprocal obligations are required).
54. See, e.g., Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957) ("A sovereign nation has
exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders,
unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction."); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 461 cmt. f (1987)
("Foreign military forces present in a state's territory with the consent of that state, such
as those stationed pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, are subject to the law of the
receiving state except as otherwise agreed between the two states."). In Wilson, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a waiver ofjurisdiction over a U.S. soldier
by the United States to Japan, even though Japanese trials did not meet due process
standards. 354 U.S. at 530; see also Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2227 (2008)
("Nevertheless, in light of the background principle thatJapan had a sovereign interest
in prosecuting crimes committed within its borders, this Court found no 'constitutional
or statutory' impediment to the United States's waiver of its jurisdiction under the
agreement.") (quoting Wilson, 354 U.S. at 530).
55. See Egan, supra note 34, at 293 (indicating that a receiving nation "voluntarily
relinquish[es] a degree of their sovereign authority" by signing a SOFA).
56. See Egan, supra note 34, at 298 (remarking that the NATO SOFA reconciles
territorial sovereignty with the right of the sending state to prosecute its personnel);
Erickson, supra note 52, at 140 (stating that SOFAs are "intended to strike a balance"
between the obligations and interests of both parties).
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2. The Exceptions Swallow the Rule: Maximizing U.S.
Jurisdiction with the Official Duty and Waiver Exceptions
The modern SOFA era is now almost sixty years old, but
there are signs that the law of the flag is dead only in name, and
not in fact.57 The United States pursues an aggressive policy of
maximizing its exclusive jurisdiction under the NATO SOFA and
other similar agreements. 58 This policy is meant to secure the due
process rights of U.S. soldiers stationed abroad,5 9 but its
expansive use runs the risk of infringing upon the sovereignty of
the receiving state. 60 This policy is implemented through two
exceptions to receiving state jurisdiction under the provisions of
the SOFA: first, the "official duty" exception and, second, the
waiver of jurisdiction provision, otherwise known as the waiver
exception.
With regard to the first exception, the "official duty"
provision has been called the "last vestige" of the law of the
flag. 61 During the negotiations for the NATO SOFA, NATO

57. See Mark R. Ruppert, CriminalJurisdiction Over Environmental Offenses Committed
Overseas: How to Maximize and When to Say "No", 40 A.F. L. REV. 1, 45 (1996) (arguing that
U.S. authorities have practically reverted to the law of the flag in some receiving states);
see also infra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing how the official duty exception
is a holdover from the law of the flag).
58. See Wexler, supra note 20, at 58 (discussing how the U.S. Senate drives the
policy to maximize jurisdiction by taking the position that military authorities "must, to
the extent practicable, exercise primary jurisdiction whenever possible"); see also
Ruppert, supra note 57, at 8 (discussing Senate resolution on the NATO SOFA calling
for a compulsory waiver request).
59. See 32 C.F.R. § 151.3 (1980) ("It is the policy of the Department of Defense to
protect, to the maximum extent possible, the rights of U.S. personnel who may be
subject to criminal trial by foreign courts and imprisonment in foreign prisons."); 32
C.F.R. § 151.6 (Waiver of receiving state jurisdiction must be requested where U.S.
constitutional rights will not be fully protected; Department of State must take
"appropriate action to safeguard rights of the accused" if waiver is not granted). The
concern over a U.S. soldier's due process rights under the U.S. Constitution, while
legitimate, is beyond the scope of this Note and has been examined elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Note, Due Process Challenge to the Korean Status of Forces Agreement, 57 GEo. L.J. 1097, 1107
(1968) (stating that the Korea SOFA, "like all other status of forces agreements,
represents a form of compromise between national interest in stationing troops abroad
and the protection of individuals rights of servicemen.").
60. See, e.g., Jung & Hwang, supra note 35, at 1115 (stating that the policy of
maximizing U.S. jurisdiction increases the possibility of offending the "sovereign
sentiment" of the receiving state); Wexler, supra note 20, at 57-58 ("[The] aggressive
stance in protecting U.S. service members from foreign jurisdiction has led to a number
of problems with other nations.").
61. Lepper, supra note 33, at 175.
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member states were concerned that the exception would
effectively swallow the rule. 62 They proposed a definition of
"official duty" that would incorporate the agency concept of
deviation: the exception would not apply when U.S. personnel
acted outside the specific ambit of their duties or orders. 63 The
United States refused to bind itself to a limited definition, and
insisted that it had the exclusive right to determine "official
duty." 64 To this day, the NATO SOFA is silent as to what
65
constitutes official duty.
U.S. policy since then has been to reserve the exclusive right
to determine official duty, and to "construe it as broadly as
reason and persuasion will allow."6 6 For example, in the case of
Wilson v. Girard, the United States claimed an official duty
exception after U.S. Specialist William S. Girard killed ajapanese
woman while on sentry duty.67 She died after Girard hit her in
the back with a spent thirty-caliber cartridge, which he had
propelled from his grenade launcher by firing a blank. 68 Japan
asserted jurisdiction, insisting that they had proof contrary to the
official duty exception. 69 With the two sides unable to agree, the
United States subsequently waived jurisdiction, thereby
preserving its position that Girard's actions had been part of his
70
official duties.
Another controversial use of the official duty exception
occurred in February 1998, when the United States invoked it
under the NATO SOFA after a U.S. military aircraft training in
the Italian Alps severed the cables of a gondola car, sending
twenty people plunging to their deaths. 71 Italian authorities had
62. See id. at 176 (recounting that the European States considered an expansive
notion of official duty a return to the law of the flag).
63. Id. at 175-76.
64. See Lepper, supra note 33, at id. at 176 (providing that consensus was not
reached on either an acceptable definition of official status or who should determine it).
65. See NATO SOFA, supra note 16, art. VII.
66. Lepper, supra note 33, at 176.
67. 354 U.S. 524, 526, 529 (1957); see also supra note 54.
68. See 354 U.S. at 526. Specialist Girard was on guard duty at a live firing range,
and the Japanese woman had entered the area during an interval, as was the local
practice at the time, to collect expended brass ammunition shells. Id.
69. See id. at 529.
70. See

SERGE

LAZAREFF,

STATUS

OF

MILITARY

FORCES

UNDER

CURRENT

INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (1971).
71. See Matthew L. Wald, Pilot Acquitted in Deaths of 20 on Ski Gondola, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 1999, at Al; see also Adrian A. Barham, The Establishment and Conduct of Extra-
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approved the flight plan, but it was later determined that the
aircraft had been operating below the agreed 1000-foot limit and
above the approved speed, and had hit the gondola cables at a
height of 360 feet.72 After the pilot was later acquitted of any
wrongdoing by a jury of marine officers sitting at Camp Lejeune
in North Carolina, outraged Italian authorities called for closures
73
of U.S. bases in Italy.
Apart from the official duty exception, the blanket use of
the waiver exception is another problematic feature of the
maximization policy. The United States always requests a waiver
of jurisdiction whenever the receiving state has jurisdiction over a
U.S. soldier.7 4 Moreover, although facially the waiver procedure
applies equally to both the sending and receiving state, receiving
states routinely grant waivers, even though the United States
almost never waives its primary jurisdiction. 75 This asymmetrical
record is made even more troublesome by the fact that after
jurisdiction is obtained, U.S. military authorities often fail to
impose adequate disciplinary measures under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice ("UCMJ") to deter U.S. personnel from
committing crimes overseas. 76 Under the UCMJ, U.S. personnel
territorialMilitary Bases in Peacetime--Some InternationalLaw Considerations,31 BRACTON
L.J. 7, 19 (1999) (discussing the gondola accident in the Italian Alps).
72. See Barham, supra note 71, at 19 (observing that the plane's flight plan was filed
with and approved by the Italian authorities); Wald, supra note 71 (indicating that pilot
was acquitted of involuntary homicide and manslaughter even though plane was flying
lower and faster than permitted).
73. See Barham, supranote 71, at 20.
74. See Conderman, supra note 47, at 117 (declaring that in all cases the United
States has sought to acquire or retain jurisdiction over its personnel through the waiver
provisions).
75. See Report of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
CODE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE § 3, at 15 (2008),
available at
http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/annual/FY08AnnualReport.pdf
(reporting
that
between December 1, 2005, and November 30, 2007, the United States obtained waivers
of jurisdiction in 2,290 of the 2,651 cases where foreign countries had concurrent
jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel-approximately eighty-six percent of all
concurrent jurisdiction cases for the reporting period-and that waivers were obtained
in 88.9% of all cases where foreign countries had either exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction); see also Lepper, supra note 33, at 176 (remarking that the United States
"rarely" waives primaryjurisdiction).
76. See Jaime M. Gher, Status of Forces Agreements: Tools to Further Effective Foreign
Policy and Lessons to be Learnedfrom the US-Japan Agreement, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 227, 239-40
(2002) (discussing how U.S. efforts to usurp jurisdiction and inconsistent disciplinary
measures compound the severity and frequency of crimes committed by U.S. soldiers in
Japan). An investigative news report also revealed that many sex offenders in the U.S.
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who are found guilty "generally only receive nonjudicial
punishments or court martials." 77 A "clear preference" of U.S.
military authorities is to pursue nonjudicial remedies, which give
commanding officers the discretion to impose a lesser
punishment, accept an administrative discharge in lieu of a
court-martial conviction, or even dismiss the charges. 78 In highintensity deployments like Iraq, it has been reported that,
compared with routine violations of military regulations, U.S.
authorities are far more lenient with cases involving criminal
misconduct against Iraqi civilians, and such cases are not always
79
investigated in a thorough or timely fashion.
While on their face, SOFAs represent a compromise
between the receiving state's territorial sovereignty and the
sending state's prerogative to discipline its own troops, the
aggressive use of both the official duty and waiver exceptions has
left at least one critic observing that SOFAs do not restrain the
United States from "riding roughshod over the feelings of a host
state." 80 From the U.S. perspective, SOFAs safeguard the basic
individual rights and liberties of U.S. soldiers. 8 1 But prominent
military, particularly on overseas bases like Okinawa, Japan, escape criminal prosecution
or go free despite convictions. Unlike civilians, many of these service members receive
no criminal record on their discharge. See Russell Carollo &Jeff Nesmith, Ugly American,
DAYrON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 8, 1995, at IA (describing cases of sex offenders in the U.S.
military deployed to Japan going free or receiving lenient treatment); see alsoJane's Story,
ECONOMIST,
Dec.
10,
2008,
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/
displaystory.cfm?storyid=12756824 (reporting that a U.S. service man was quietly
discharged without punishment by the U.S. Navy after committing a violent rape in 2002
while stationed in Japan).
77. Gher, supra note 76, at 240.
78. See Wexler, supra note 20, at 50-51 (noting that handling cases with
administrative measures "inevitably" produces lighter sanctions).
79. See Russell Carollo & Larry Caplow, Justice at War: Troops Receive Light Sentences
for Violent Crimes Against Iraqis, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 2, 2005, at Al (describing how

soldiers accused of property crimes or violations of military rules are sometimes treated
more harshly than those convicted of beating, robbing, or killing Iraqis; and not all such
cases are investigated). The same report also quotes Gary D. Solis, a former U.S. military
judge and West Point instructor, who stated with regard to the lenient sentences, "I have
an uneasy suspicion that it relates to the nationality of the victim." Id.
80. Barham, supra note 71, at 23; see also Ruppert, supra note 57, at 45 (noting that
maximization policy has produced a complacent attitude in military commanders, who
fail to appreciate the infringement on sovereignty that a waiver of jurisdiction request
entails).
81. See Egan, supra note 34, at 306 (stating that the policy of maximizing
jurisdiction derives in part from concerns that local criminal justice systems do not
afford U.S. troops minimum due process).
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commentators have also emphasized that SOFA provisions are
meant to balance the demands of sovereignty between the
sending and receiving state, and should not leave host
82
populations without legal protection.
Part I.C examines the Korea SOFA as an example of such
"sovereignty-sharing agreements" to examine the issues that
surround their implementation, their impact on local
populations, and the legal issues that pertain. But before turning
to the Korea SOFA, a discussion of the development of human
rights law and of article 2 of the ICCPR will help to frame the
conflict between the ICCPR and the Korea SOFA.
B.

TransformingInternationalLaw: The Development of
Human Rights

The advent of the SOFA model of criminal jurisdiction in
the period immediately prior to World War II coincided with
another
transformation
in
international
law.8 3
That
transformation, the development of human rights law, began
with the creation of the United Nations ("U.N."). 8 4 This section
briefly discusses the philosophical innovation of human rights
law, before turning to an overview of article 2 of the ICCPR.
82. See LAZAREFF, supra note 70, at 207 ("Indeed, SOFA, in many sections
recognizes the overriding principle of territorial sovereignty. Therefore, is it not
essential that the rights of the nationals of the Receiving State be protected?"); see also
Status of Forces Agreements and UN Mandates: What Authorities and Protections Do They
Provide to U.S. Personnel?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on International Organizations,
Human Rights, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, I10th Cong. 40 (2008)
(statement of Ruth Wedgwood, Professor, Johns Hopkins University) ("Recent
headlines concerning events on the Japanese island of Okinawa highlight the
importance of providing safeguards both to American forces stationed abroad and to
the civilian populations with whom they come in contact."). Professor Ruth Wedgwood
is currently a member of the Human Rights Committee ("HRC"), an independent body
of experts established under the ICCPR to supervise and monitor compliance by state
parties with the provisions of the Covenant. See Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for
Human Rights, Human Rights Committee-Members, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/hrc/members.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2010) (listing current members of the
HRC). For more on the role of the HRC in the implementation of the ICCPR, see infra
note 98.
83. See Henkin, supra note 31, at 3 ("The international human rights movement is
a third transformation.").
84. See, e.g., PAUL KENNEDY, THE PARLIAMENT OF MAN: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 178 (2006) (stating that between 1945 and 1948 the
U.N. established an international human rights regime that had unprecedented legal
effect).
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Redefining Sovereignty through Human Rights Treaties

As the noted international law scholar Professor Louis
Henkin put it, the years immediately following the birth of the
international human rights movement out of the tumult of
World War II "represented a significant erosion of state
sovereignty." 85 The development of international human rights
ushered in new understandings of sovereignty that have tested
the classical assumptions of state sovereignty. 86 According to one
scholar, evolving notions of sovereignty have shifted the
discourse from a monochromatic idea of the sovereignty of
nation-states, to the idea that sovereignty attaches to individual
persons, based on a deepening sense of state responsibility to its
87
citizens that is derived from the consent of the governed.
The innovation of the time is aptly demonstrated by the
final touches taken by the U.N. committee tasked with drafting
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR").88 The
drafting committee adopted a change proposed by the French
89
delegation to replace "International" with "Universal."
According to Johannes Morsink, the change in diction shifted
the emphasis of the document away from the nation states that
were its authors, and toward the intended addressees, the
ordinary persons of the world. 90 In his remarks to the General
Assembly on the change, the French delegate Ren6 Cassin
captured the sense of the moment when he noted that
"something new ha[d] entered the world." 91
85. Henkin, supra note 31, at 4.
86. See id. at 4-5 ("So a major rent developed in the cloak of sovereignty, due to
this idea of human rights.").
87. See Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2050 (2003)
("Sovereignty attaches itself to the people of the state, not merely the state itself, in a
multi-directional social contract.").
88. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
89. See JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS:
ORIGINS, DRAFTING AND INTENT 33 (1999).

90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting Ren6 Cassin at a debate before the General Assembly) (alteration
in original). This sense of wonder at the revolution in international law unfolding
before the delegates was often echoed by Professor Cassin during the drafting process.
In December 1947, during the Second Session of the Commission on Human Rights, he
requested that the following comment be reported:
In voting for the draft Declaration, the French delegation emphasized that it
constitutes the first stage reached after eighteen months work. Its defects do not
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This is not to say that the twenty-first century was an
unqualified triumph of human rights and universal values.
Classic state sovereignty retains vitality as a legal doctrine, and
human rights law imposes legal obligations on states only as far as
they agree to be so bound. 92 Nonetheless, in the over half a
century since the UDHR, binding norms of international human
rights law have emerged, and states increasingly subscribe to
them. Human rights treaties and the customary law of human
rights represent these fundamental obligations, and states violate
these obligations when they fail to respect and ensure the rights
recognized, or fail to provide remedies for rights that have been
93
violated.
Chief among these human rights treaties is the International
Bill of Rights, which is comprised of the ICCPR,94 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR"), 95 and the UDHR;96 the ICCPR and the ICESCR give
legal effect to the aspirational principles articulated in the
UDHR.97 As Martin Scheinin, a past member of the Human

detract from the fact that it contributes something new: the individual becomes a
subject of international law in respect of his life and liberty; principles are affirmed,
side by side with those already laid down by the majority of national laws which no
national or international authority had hitherto been able to proclaim, let alone
enforce.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Report of the Commission on Human Rights, 2nd
Session, Geneva, Dec. 2 to Dec. 17, 1947, Annex A, part II, 5, U.N. Doc. E/600 (Dec. 17,
1947)..
92. Henkin, supra note 31, at 5 ("Sovereign states accept international human
rights standards... to the extent they wish to.").
93. LOUiS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 315 (1st ed.1999); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 207 reporter's n. 5

(1987) ("In general, a state is responsible for inaction when it fails to carry out some
international obligation to act, whether an obligation assumed by international
agreement (§ 321), or one imposed by customary law ....In addition to liability for
failure to take appropriate steps to prevent harm to a foreign national, a state may be
liable for failure to take steps to punish a violation of such rights.").
94. See ICCPR, supranote 26.
95. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, S.TREATY DOC. NO. 95-19 (1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
96. See ICCPR, supra note 26.
97. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 20 (1990) (stating that the international
law of human rights is contained principally in the ICCPR and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, both of which embody the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
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Rights Committee 98 ("HRC") argues, human rights law has
acquired the character of a legal constitution, and operates as
"an objective normative order above states." 99 This understanding
articulates the position that human rights law represents a
countervailing force to the contractual nature of public
international law, which is constrained only by state consent and
reciprocity. 10 0 While Martin Scheinin's opinion may be
considered too expansive for classical notions of international
law, it is undeniable today that the ICCPR is an international
covenant with binding legal effect. The following section
discusses ICCPR article 2 in detail, with attention paid to the
substantive obligations undertaken by state parties.
2.

Article 2 of the ICCPR

The nations around the world that consider themselves state
parties to the ICCPR-such as the United States and the ROK-are

98. The Human Rights Committee ("HRC") is established by article 28 of the

ICCPR: it is a body of independent experts elected by State parties that monitors
implementation of the ICCPR by its State parties, has the competence to entertain both
inter-state and individual complaints regarding alleged violations of the ICCPR, and,

pursuant to article 40(4), issues conclusive interpretations of the provisions of the
ICCPR known as General Comments. See Office of the U.N High Comm'r for Human
Rights, Human
Rights Committee: Monitoring Civil and Political Rights,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/
(last visited Mar. 5, 2010); see also
MANFRED NOwAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY XXIII-V (2005) (discussing the role of the HRC in supervising
adherence to the ICCPR).
99. Martin Scheinin, ExtraterritorialEffect of the ICCPR, in EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 73, 78 (Fons Coomans & Menno T.
Kamminga eds., 2004) (emphasis in original).
100. See U.N. Human Rights Comm. [HRC], General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating
to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols
Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant,
8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add.6 (Nov. 11, 1994) [hereinafter General Comment 24] ("Although
treaties that are mere exchanges of obligations between States allow them to reserve inter
se application of rules of general international law, it is otherwise in human rights
treaties, which are for the benefit of persons within their jurisdiction."); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 102 cmt. f (1987)
("Ordinarily, an agreement between states is a source of law only in the sense that a
private contract may be said to make law for the parties under the domestic law of
contracts. Multilateral agreements open to all states, however, are increasingly used ...
to make new law, as in human rights...."); see also infra notes 195-96 and
accompanying text (discussing how human rights treaties are privileged within the
hierarchy of norms in international law).
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legally bound by the obligations it creates. 101 ICCPR article 2
emphasizes that individuals are the beneficiaries of the rights
creating language in the covenant, and imposes corresponding
10 2
duties on state parties to "respect and to ensure" these rights.
These obligations have "an accessory character;" that is, article 2
establishes no free-standing substantive rights, but imposes
affirmative duties on the state parties based on substantive rights
recognized in the covenant. 0 3 The numerous substantive rights
guaranteed to all individuals under the covenant include, among
others, "the inherent right to life," 10 4 and the right to be free

101. See General Comment 24, supra note 100,
7 ("The object and purpose of the
Covenant is to create legally binding standards for human rights by defining certain civil
and political fights and placing them in a framework of obligations which are legally
binding for those States which ratify; and to provide an efficacious supervisory
machinery for the obligations undertaken."); see also supra note 93, and accompanying
text (noting that human rights treaties represent fundamental legal obligations for
states).
102. ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 2(1). Article 2 provides in its entirety:
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures,
each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary
steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of
the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official
capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities ofjudicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
when granted.
Id.
103. NOWAK, supra note 98, at 29 ("[A] violation of Art. 2 can occur only in
conjunction with the concrete exercise (but not necessarily violation) of one of the
substantive rights ensured by the Covenant.").
104. ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 6(1) ("Every human being has the inherent right to
life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life.").
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from
"cruel,
inhuman
or
degrading
treatment
or
' 105
punishment."
By imposing duties on state parties to protect Covenant
rights within their domestic legal systems, article 2 expresses the
principle that "the implementation of human rights under
international law is primarily a domestic matter."10 6 For example,
article 2(1) incorporates two state obligations "to respect and to
ensure" with a jurisdictional clause: "to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction .... 1 07 According to
Professor Dominic McGoldrick, the concept ofjurisdiction under
international law "explains the orthodox situations in which
states make and enforce rules of law governing individuals and
other legal entities."1 0 8 Under human rights law, the ability of a
state to exercise its authority over persons and to give legal effect
to individual rights is "a starting point for imposing obligations
on state."' 10 9
Pursuant to article 2(1) of the ICCPR, each state party must
adopt measures that give legal effect to the human rights
recognized in the covenant for all individual persons within their
territory and under their jurisdiction." 0 This entails both a
negative obligation to refrain from interfering with the
enumerated rights, and a positive obligation to guarantee that
individuals within its jurisdiction have access to substantive and
105. Id. art. 7 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his
free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.").
106. NOWAK, supra note 98, at 28; see also HRC, General Comment No. 31: The Nature
of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR.C.21.Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment 31] ("The
Covenant cannot be viewed as a substitute for domestic criminal or civil law.").
107. ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
108. Dominic McGoldrick,
Extraterritorial Application of the ICCPR, in
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIEs 41, 45 (Fons Coomans &
Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004).
109. Id. There can be no fundamental duty or obligation pertaining to any right
unless the state party has the opportunity to exercise its influence over the outcome. See
NOWAK, supra note 98, at 29 (stating that privileging domestic implementation of
covenant rights follows from international law principles mandating exhaustion of
domestic remedies before international enforcement); McGoldrick, supra note 108, at
46 (arguing that covenant rights should not extend to individuals unless the state wields
some degree of governmental power over them).
110. See ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 2(1); see also NOWAK, supra note 98, at XXV
(discussing the state obligation under article 2 to adopt all necessary measures to give
effect to covenant rights).
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procedural protections."' Moreover, these legal protections must
be applied to all individuals without discrimination of any
kind. 12 The HRC has expressly stated that article 2 provides the
"overarching framework" for the protection of all the substantive
rights of the ICCPR, such as the right to life. 113 Accordingly,
when the implementation of article 2 is stymied, the other
114
substantive rights of the ICCPR cannot be effectively secured.
Article 2(3) is crucial for defining the obligations under
present scrutiny. Article 2 (3) (a) mandates that any violation must
have a corresponding remedy that is effective in practice.1 1 5 To
discharge the duty to provide an effective remedy, there is a clear
preference for judicial remedies, and purely political or
administrative remedies will not suffice.11 6 Moreover, the HRC
has made it clear in its jurisprudence that purely administrative
or disciplinary remedies are insufficient for serious violations of
human rights such as the right to life; for these violations,
criminal investigations and subsequent prosecution are
"necessary remedies.' 1 7 The general obligation to investigate
111. General Comment 31, supra note 106, 6 ("The legal obligation under article 2,
paragraph 1, is both negative and positive in nature. State Parties must refrain from
violation of the rights recognized by the Covenant .... ); see also NOWAK, supra note 98,
at 37-38 (distinguishing between the negative aspect of the obligation "to respect" and
the positive aspect of the obligation "to ensure").
112. ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 2(1). The duty of nondiscrimination in article 2 is
extended by article 26, which states that "all persons are equal before the law and
entitled to equal protection of the law." While a treatment of article 26 is beyond the
scope of this Note, its prohibition against discrimination does pose challenges to a
scheme ofjurisdictional waiver under which the receiving state is only entitled to request
a waiver of jurisdiction for cases of "particular importance." See infra notes 139-42 and
accompanying text.
113. General Comment 31, supra note 106, 5.
114. See McGoldrick, supra note 108, at 45 (suggesting that article 2(1) must be
read into all the substantive rights of the Covenant); NOWAK, supra note 98, at 29
(commenting that article 2 is an "umbrella clause" for all the rights of the covenant with
"an important function in [its] systematic interpretation"(emphasis in original)).
115. ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 2(3)(a) (expressly providing for "an effective
remedy" for violations of the rights recognized under the covenant, irrespective of
whether the perpetrator was "acting in an official capacity.").
116. NOWAK, supranote 98, at 64 (citing HRC commentary).
117. HRC, Communication No. 1447/2006: Views of the Human Rights Committee Under
Article 5, Paragraph4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
11.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1447/2006 (Apr.
Political Rights (Amirov v. Russia),
22, 2009); see also HRC, Communication No. 612/95: Views of the Human Rights Committee
Under Article 5, Paragraph4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
8.2, U.N. Doc.
v. Colombia),
and Political Rights (Vicente et al.
CCPR/C/60/D/612/1995, (Aug. 19, 1997) (declaring that purely disciplinary and
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allegations of violations must be done promptly, thoroughly, and
effectively through independent and impartial bodies; a failure
by a state party to investigate allegations of violations could in
and of itself give rise to a separate breach of Article 2(3).118
Where investigations reveal violations of covenant rights, a
failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations would
also constitute a breach of the ICCPR. 119 A failure to ensure
ICCPR rights could rise to the level of an affirmative violation, if
the state party fails to exercise due diligence in preventing,
punishing, investigating, or redressing the harm caused by the
acts of private persons or entities.1 20 The HRC has also
emphasized that the problem of impunity may encourage the
recurrence of these types of violations. 121 Indeed, no official
status justifies immunizing persons accused of such violations
22
from legal responsibility.]
Based on these legal facts, the policy of maximizing
jurisdiction as expressed in agreements like the Korea SOFA
raises certain problems with regard to state obligations under
article 2 of the ICCPR. Part I.C discusses this conflict in detail
through a case study of the operation of criminal jurisdiction
provisions of the Korea SOFA, before turning to a discussion of
how ICCPR obligations are implicated in this legal framework.

administrative remedies are inadequate within the meaning of article 2(3) when
violation of the right to life is alleged); HRC, Communication No. 563/93: Views of the
Human Rights Committee Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the
InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights (Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia),
8.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993 (Nov. 13, 1995) (determining that disciplinary
sanctions and monetary reparations by themselves are insufficient remedies for
violations of the right to life).
118. General Comment 31, supra note 106, 9 15.
119. Id. It 8, 18.
120. Id. 1 8.

121. Id. While the HRC was concerned with impunity over systemic and egregious
violations such as torture, extra-judicial killings, and enforced disappearances, the
general principle against state impunity is equally applicable to the Korea SOFA context.
Notably, a U.S. Army Reserve Major, commenting on the abnormally high rate of sexual
assaults among U.S. servicemen based overseas, told reporters: "There is often a party
atmosphere and an attitude of: 'I can act out, and I'm not going to get caught.' That's
why they feel free to abuse other humans." Carollo & Nesmith, supra note 76.
122. ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 2(1); see also General Comment 31, supra note 106,

9
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The Challenge of Human Rights: The Korea SOFA and Article 2 of
the ICCPR

The Korea SOFA was, from its very beginning, a creature of
necessity. Not long after the Korean War ground into a stalemate
and hostilities ceased between the North and the South, the
United States and the ROK entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty
in 1954.123 Pursuant to article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty,
the Korea SOFA was signed in 1966 as a sole executive agreement
to govern the legal status of U.S. troops in the ROK. 124 Although
the NATO SOFA provided the model framework, the Korea
SOFA is not reciprocal on the United States, and diverges in
other key ways from the NATO SOFA. 25 No peace treaty has
been signed between the North and the South, and the United
States continues to maintain a military presence 28,500 strong in
the Korean Peninsula. 126 Commentators have suggested that the
ravages of the Korean War, coupled with the threat of imminent
attack from the North, left the ROK with little choice but to
127
accept agreements that were asymmetrical and nonreciprocal.
123. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea,
U.S.-S.Korea, Oct. 1, 1953, 5 U.S.T. 1677, 674 U.N.T.S. 163. Under the Mutual Defense
treaty, the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction over any offenses committed by
U.S. personnel in the ROK, justifying it on the basis that the ROK had a poor record of
'enforcing Western judicial fights." Egan, supra note 34, at 314. This arrangement
proved difficult to maintain after civil unrest and political instability in the ROK was
blamed on the extraterritorial status of U.S. soldiers. See id. (citing a 1960 coup that was
attributed to the government's unwillingness or inability to punish serious crimes
committed by U.S. soldiers against Koreans).
124. See Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of
Korea, supra note 123, art. IV. The distinction between sole executive agreements and
treaties is one for U.S. constitutional law alone, and is beyond the scope of this Note. See
supra note 53 and accompanying text.
125. See U.S. ARMYJUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., OPERATIONAL
LAW HANDBOOK 2007, at 404 (2007), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/
14198/operational lawhandbook_2007.html (identifying the Korea SOFA as applying
only to U.S. soldiers in the ROK; it also does not accord equal rights to Korean soldiers
visiting the United States); see also Lee, supra note 23, at 229 (comparing how the Korea
SOFA expressly restricts ROK jurisdiction to "distinct minority of cases" with how the
NATO SOFA respects the legal regime of receiving states).
126. See U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of E. Asian & Pac. Affairs, Background Note:
South Korea (Oct. 2009), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm (stating that a
2008 agreement between the United States and the ROK capped the number of U.S.
troops in the ROK at 28,500 with no plans for further reductions).
127. See Lee, supra note 23, at 221 (surmising that the ROK's dire post war situation
led it to accept international agreements that fell short of prevailing norms); see also
Gher, supra note 76, at 241 (reasoning that Asian countries like Japan and the ROK have
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Amendments to the Korea SOFA in 1991 and 2001, however,
have gone some way to address the imbalance between the
12 8
parties.
1. Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Korea SOFA
The Korea SOFA borrows its framework of exclusive and
concurrent criminal jurisdiction from the NATO SOFA, but with
some significant changes. 12 9 Under article XXII of the Korea
SOFA, the United States has the right to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers for offenses that are "punishable by
the law of the United States, but not by the law of the Republic of
Korea." 130 The converse is also true for offenses that are
punishable only under Korean law. a31
The "system of priorities," as contemplated under the
concurrent jurisdiction framework of the NATO SOFA, applies
when an offense violates both U.S. and Korean law. 13 2 For
example, if a U.S. soldier commits homicide in Korea, ROK
authorities will have primary jurisdiction, unless the offense is
solely against the property or security of the United States, only
against another U.S. armed forces member, or if it arises out of
any act or omission done in the performance of an official
duty.133 According to the agreed minutes to the Korea SOFA,
which is incorporated to the Korea SOFA, an official duty is
defined as an act "required" by military duty, and does not

a lopsided relationship with the United States because of their economic and military
dependency); Jung & Hwang, supra note 35, at 1115-16 (stating that the ROK is
vulnerable to U.S. pressure and that international law permits states to alter equitable
principles of international law by bilateral agreement to favor a state with stronger
bargaining power).
128. See Egan, supra note 34, at 317-20 (discussing how the amendments have
gradually expanded ROKjurisdiction); see also Wexler, supra note 20, at 63 (noting that
ROKjurisdiction has grown over the years but an unequal power dynamic still remains).
129. See Lee, supra note 23, at 218 (indicating that the Korea SOFA, unlike the
NATO SOFA, incorporates additional terms that limit ROK jurisdiction to a greater
extent); Wexler, supra note 20, at 61 (noting that the NATO and Korea SOFAs appear
similar but that the United States negotiated addenda that both expand and diminish
U.S. jurisdiction).
130. Korea SOFA, supra note 18, art. XXII (2)(a).
131. See id., art. XXII (2) (b).
132. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
133. Korea SOFA, supra note 18, art. XXII (3).

20101

BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE

necessarily apply to all acts performed while on duty. 134 As
elaborated by the agreed understandings to the Korea SOFA,
which is also incorporated to the agreement, the conduct in
question must constitute a "substantial departure" from actions
required in their military duties before it will fall outside the
135
definition of "official duty."
Even without considering the empirical record of the Korea
SOFA's implementation, several problems are already apparent
on the face of the text. First, the agreed minutes to the Korea
SOFA provides that "a certificate issued by competent military
authorities of the United States stating that the alleged offense
... arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of
official duty shall be sufficient evidence of the fact for the
purpose of determining primary jurisdiction." 136 In the words of
134. Agreed Minutes to the Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, Regarding
Facilities And Areas And the Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of
Korea, U.S.-S. Korea, art. XXII, Re paragraph 3(a), § 1, July 9, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1768
[hereinafter Agreed Minutes to Korea SOFA].
135. Agreed Understandings to the Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual
Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,
Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in the
Republic of Korea and Related Agreed Minutes, U.S.-S. Korea, art. XXII, Agreed Minute
Re Paragraph 3(a), § 1, July 9, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1813, [hereinafter Agreed
Understandings to Korea SOFA]. The agreed understandings were terminated in 1991
pursuant to an exchange of diplomatic letters. See Agreement Between the United States
and Korea Terminating the Agreed Understandings and Exchange of Letters of July 9,
1966 Related to the Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty
Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of U.S. Armed Forces in Korea, U.S.-S.
Korea,
1, Feb. 1, 1991, Temp. State Dep't No. 91-70, 1991 WL 494904 [hereinafter
1991 Exchange of Letters]. However, superseding understandings entered by the parties
in 1991 and 2001 reasserted the "substantial departure" language. See Understandings to
the Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Republic of Korea Regarding Facilities and Areas and the
Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea and Related Agreed
Minutes, As Amended U.S.-S. Korea, art. XXII, Agreed Minute Re Paragraph 3(a), § 1,
Jan. 18, 2001, Temp. State Dep't No. 01-57, 2001 WL 681235 [hereinafter 2001
Understandings to Korea SOFA]; Understandings on Implementation of the Agreement
Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Republic of Korea Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States
Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea and Related Agreed Minutes, U.S.-S. Korea, art.
XXII, Agreed Minute Re Paragraph 3(a), §1, Feb. 1, 1991, http://www.dprkstudies.org/
documents/1966-1991-US-ROK SOFA.pdf [hereinafter 1991 Understandings to Korea
SOFA]. It should be noted here that the NATO SOFA is silent on a definition of official
duty. See supranote 65 and accompanying text.
136. Agreed Minutes to Korea SOFA, supra note 134, art. XXII, Re Paragraph 3(a),
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one commentator, the Korea SOFA assigns the determination of
the scope of official duty to the United States alone, leaving the
13 7
ROK with little recourse to challenge the determination.
Although this resolves the silence in the NATO SOFA with regard
to who determines official duty, the Korea SOFA settles the
ambiguity squarely in favor of the United States. As written, this
provision gives the United States the exclusive authority to fix the
1 38
limits of its primary jurisdiction.
Second, the agreed minutes provide that the ROK will, when
U.S. military authorities so request, "waive their primary right to
exercise jurisdiction ...

except when they determine that it is of

particular importance that jurisdiction be exercised by the
authorities of the Republic of Korea." 39 In effect, this provision
establishes a general waiver in favor of the United States by
creating a presumption that the ROK will always waive its
jurisdiction, except in those extraordinary circumstances when a
case is deemed to be of "particular importance." 14 0 By reversing
the system of priorities established in the NATO SOFA, this
modification subverts the careful balance and the intent of the
compromise embodied in concurrent jurisdiction. 141 Despite the
amendments to the Korea SOFA, this reversal of priorities is
142
preserved to this day.
Perhaps in recognition of these concerns, the United States
and the ROK revised the ROK SOFA in 1991143 and 2001144 to
137. See Lee, supra note 23, at 228 (stating that the agreed minutes unilaterally
assigns determination to the United States, leaving the ROK with little means to
question U.S. military authorities).
138. See id. ("Put simply, the United States reserves the right to delineate its
primaryjurisdiction as it sees fit.").
139. Agreed Minutes to Korea SOFA, supra note 134, art. XXII, Re Paragraph 3(b),

§ 1.
140. Id.
141. See Lazareff, supra note 70, at 195 (considering an identical provision in a
1954 bilateral agreement between the United States and the Netherlands modifying the
system of priorities established in the NATO SOFA). According to Lazareff, this
"regrettable practice" grants the sending state a general and primary right of
jurisdiction, giving it the right to grant or refuse a waiver, and constitutes a serious
violation of the principle of territorial sovereignty. Id. at 59.
142. See 1991 Exchange of Letters, supra note 135 (terminating the agreed
understandings, but not the agreed minutes which reverses the system of priorities).
143. See 1991 Exchange of Letters, supra note 135; 1991 Understandings to Korea
SOFA, supra note 135; Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Republic of Korea Concerning Special Measures Relating to Article V of the Agreement
Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America
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more equitably share the sovereign prerogative of criminal
jurisdiction.1 45 Before the 1991 amendment, the ROK's primary
jurisdiction over an offense would be automatically waived unless
it informed the United States within fifteen days that it wished to
initiate proceedings, while the United States was not labored by a
similar burden. 146 The 1991 amendments terminated this
arrangement, and the United States no longer enjoys the
presumption of primary jurisdiction. 147 Pursuant to these
revisions, the state wishing to exercise jurisdiction over a case
within the other state's primary jurisdiction is to request a waiver,
to which the other side has twenty-eight days-which can be
extended to forty-two days if special reasons are present-to
respond. 48 Although the 1991 amendments retain the reversed
system of priorities established in the agreed minutes, it still

and the Republic of Korea Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of Armed
Forces in the Republic of Korea, U.S.-S. Korea, Jan. 25, 1991, Temp. State Dep't No. 9185, 1991 WL 494919.
144. See 2001 Understandings to Korea SOFA, supra note 135; Agreement Between
the United States of America and the Republic of Korea Amending the Agreement
Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Republic of Korea, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United
States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea of July 9, 1966, as Amended, U.S.-S.
KoreaJan. 18, 2001, Temp. State Dep't No. 01-56, 2001 WL 681233; Amendments to the
Agreed Minutes of July 9, 1966 to the Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual
Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,
Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in the
Republic of Korea, as Amended, U.S.-S. Korea, Jan. 18, 2001, Temp. State Dep't No. 0155, 2001 WL 681227 [hereinafter 2001 Amendments to Korea SOFA Minutes]. These
amendments are collected, along with other 2001 agreements that affect the Korea
SOFA,
at
http://www.usfk.mil/usfk/uploads/130/
us-rokstatusofforcesagreement2001 amendments.pdf.
145. Egan, supra note 34, at 317-19 (noting that the 1991 amendment implements
a more equitable arrangement and that both the 1991 and 2001 amendments favored
the ROK).
146. See Exchange of Letters between Winthrop G. Brown, the Ambassador of the
United States of America to the Republic of Korea and Tong Won Lee, Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, U.S.-S. KoreaJuly 9, 1966, 17 U.T.S. 1830.
147. See 1991 Exchange of Letters, supra note 135,
1 (terminating the 1966
exchange of letters); Timm, supra note 52, at 459 (stating that the 1991 amendment
requires the United States to submit an individual request for waiver in every case).
148. See 1991 Understandings to Korea SOFA, supra note 135, art. XXII, Paragraph
3(c), §4.
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represents a marked improvement because it imposes the duty to
149
request for a waiver on both parties.
The 1991 amendment also permits the ROK authorities to
"discuss, question, or object to any United States armed forces
official duty certificate," and the United States must in turn give
"due consideration" to their concerns. 150 While favorable to the
ROK, this revision hardly strays from the original text of the
agreed understandings. 151 The ROK continues to have no input
in the determination of official duty, and the amendment vests
jurisdiction with the United States if agreement cannot be
reached within thirty days of the original duty certificate, leaving
15 2
a diplomatic challenge vulnerable to political foot-dragging.
Significantly, the 1991 amendments also terminated a list of
representative cases that were meant to illustrate the criteria for a
case of "particular importance. " 153 One commentator noted that
the deletion expanded the ROK's jurisdictional authority by
giving it greater autonomy to decide whether a case was of
"particular importance," but this expanded authority has yet to
be realized in the implementation of the text. 154 The give-andtake evidenced in the negotiations for the 1991 amendments
notwithstanding, U.S. military authorities acting in accordance
with the policy of maximizing jurisdiction always request for a

149. See id., art. XXII, Paragraph 3(c), § 1; Timm, supra note 52, at 459 n.89 (noting
that the provision is symmetrical i.e. if the United States has primary jurisdiction the
ROK request will be subject to the same procedures).
150. 1991 Understandings to Korea SOFA, supra note 135, art. XXII, Agreed
Minute Re Paragraph 3(a), § 3(a).
151. See Agreed Understandings to Korea SOFA, supra note 135, Agreed Minute Re
Paragraph 3(a), § 3(a) ("United States authorities shall give due consideration to any
objection which may be raised by the Chief Prosecutor for the Republic of Korea.").
152. See 1991 Understandings to Korea SOFA, supra note 135, Agreed Minute Re
Paragraph 3(a), § 3(b). After 1991, ROK authorities can refer duty certificate disputes to
a U.S.-ROKjoint committee or its criminal jurisdiction subcommittee for resolution. Id.
The United States reserves the right to take jurisdiction after thirty days regardless of
ongoing discussions, to preserve the defendant's constitutional right to a prompt and
speedy trial. Id.
153. See 1991 Exchange of Letters, supra note 135,
1 (terminating the agreed
understandings).
154. See Timm, supra note 52, at 459 n.90 (explaining that the ROK became more
assertive in 1995, refusing to waive jurisdiction over "even simple assault cases and minor
traffic cases," which caused the United States to convene discussions with the ROK that
brought the practice to an end); cf Lee, supra note 23, at 238 (noting that where the
legal consequences of a situation turn on a matter of textual interpretation, the United
States frequently takes the role of deciding and interpreting).
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waiver from the ROK of its primary jurisdiction, and the ROK has
155
almost always complied.
The 2001 amendments were primarily aimed at alleviating
concerns over environmental damage arising from U.S. military
activities in the ROK, but it also improved the ROK's ability to
obtain custody over accused U.S. soldiers. As a result, the ROK
has now greater privileges to either maintain custody over the
accused or to obtain an earlier transfer of custody (at the time of
indictment) for certain heinous crimes. 156 This addresses local
concerns that lack of access to the accused can hinder a full
investigation of the allegations, thereby frustrating the
157
administration ofjustice.
2.

Problems with Implementing the Korea SOFA

Despite the revisions over the years to the Korea SOFA that
have brought it up to par with the NATO SOFA, the record of its
implementation with regard to criminal jurisdiction and the
interests of justice has been mixed. The popular impression
among Koreans is that U.S. soldiers break the law with little to no
repercussions. 158 U.S. sources tend to report off-duty offenses by
155. SeeJung & Hwang, supra note 35, at 1130 (discussing statistics that show the
ROK handed over ninety-seven percent of cases where it had primary jurisdiction upon
U.S. request (citing JANG-HIE LEE ET AL., A STUDY ON THE STATUS OF FORCES
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9
(2000))); Lee, supra note 23, at 229 (stating that the United States always requests
waivers and the ROK is bound by the agreed minutes to hand over primary jurisdiction
in nearly all instances). But see Wexler, supranote 20, at 63 (noting that there is evidence
of a gradual expansion in ROKjurisdiction (citing Egan, supra note 33, at 319-20)).
156. See 2001 Amendments to Korea SOFA Minutes, supra note 144, art. XXII, Add
a New Agreed Minute re Paragraph 5(c), § 3 (including in the list of heinous crimes
murder, rape, kidnapping for ransoms, illegal drug trafficking, manufacturing illegal
drugs for distribution, arson, robbery with a dangerous weapon, attempts to commit the
foregoing offenses, assault resulting in death, driving under the influence resulting in
death, fleeing the scene of a fatal traffic accident, and offences which include one or
more of the aforementioned offenses as lesser included offenses).
157. See, e.g., Commentator Deplores South Korean "Subjugation" to US Interests, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Jun. 7, 2000, available at LexisNexis AllNews Database
and on file with Author (quoting Professor Kang Chi-won that "[t] he problem, above
all, is the inability of ROK authorities to interrogate US service members who are under
physical detention"); cf Mark E. Eichelman, International CriminalJurisdictionIssues for
the United States Military, 2000 ARMY LAW. 23, 27 (noting that the Japanese treated U.S.
refusals to turn over rape suspects in cases where Japan had primary jurisdiction as a
means to impede investigations and enable U.S. soldiers to escape justice).
158. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 39, at 161 (discussing Korean protests against
special treatment when a Korean Court sentenced Private Kenneth Markle to fifteen
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U.S. military personnel, for which the ROK authorities routinely
impose fines and jail terms. 159 The reputation of impunity may be
overemphasized, but the issue remains as to incidents that go
unreported or for the minority of cases that fall under the Korea
SOFA's official duty exception.
As discussed above, the official duty exception in the Korea
SOFA permits the United States to unilaterally determine official
duty status. 160 In 2002, the inherent asymmetry of this provision
generated serious tension between the two allies. On June 13,
2002, two thirteen year-old girls were run over and killed by a
sixty-ton U.S. armored minesweeper en route to a training
exercise when walking to a birthday party in a village fifteen miles
north of Seoul. 161 Although the Korea SOFA provides for full and
mutual assistance from both parties in the investigation of an
offense, 62 Korean authorities were not given access to the
accident scene during the crucial early stages of the
investigation. 163 U.S. military authorities quickly classified the
accident under the official duty exception of the Korea SOFA,

years imprisonment for a brutal rape and murder in 1992); Gwyn Kirk & Carolyn Bowen
Francis, Redefining Security: Women Challenge United States Military Policy and Practice in
East Asia, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 256-57 (analyzing Korean resentment toward
light sentences imposed on U.S. soldiers for crimes against Koreans in relation to
harsher punishments for crimes against another U.S. soldier).
159. See, e.g., Franklin Fisher, Lawyer: Americans Can Expect Fair Trial in S. Korea,
STARS
& STRIPES,
Apr.
15,
2007,
available at http://www.stripes.com/
article.asp?section=104&article=45096 (summarizing various cases where Korean courts
imposed sentences against U.S. soldiers but also noting their general leniency); Anthony
Lukas, Seoul Convicts First U.S. Civilian Under Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1968, at 10
(discussing four cases where Korean courts handed down verdicts for offenses against
Koreans by U.S. soldiers ranging from assault, rape, and negligent homicide).
160. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
161. Jeremy Kirk, Year in Review: A Look Back at the Top Pacific Stories from 2002Turmoil in S. Korea, STARS & STRIPES, Jan. 2, 2003, available at http://www.stripes.com/
article.asp?section=104&article= 1868&archive=true.
162. See Korea SOFA, supra note 18, art. XXII, § 6(a) ("The military authorities of
the United States and the authorities of the Republic of Korea shall assist each other in
the carrying out of all necessary investigation into offenses, and in the collection and
production of evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over of
objects connected with an offense.").
163. See Lee, supra note 23, at 215-16 (noting that Korean police were given limited
authority to investigate despite the provisions of the Korea SOFA); What Lies Under the
SOFA?, KOREA TIMES, May 7, 2003, available at LexisNexis AllNews Database and on file
with Author (reporting that Korean police did not initially have access to the
investigation because of the number of military vehicles at the scene).
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and the family of each girl was compensated the equivalent of
about US$150,000.164
According to the U.S. inquiry, the tragic events on that day
came down to a faulty communication headset in the vehicle, but
local Koreans were dubious about the official duty determination
because standard operating procedures were not followed at the
time of the accident. 165 After mass protests erupted in Seoul
when the United States declined to prosecute the men
responsible, the United States reversed its earlier position and
decided to try the soldiers for negligent homicide in courts
martial. 166 Despite the ROK request for waiver of jurisdiction,
U.S. military authorities refused, insisting that because the case
fell under the official duty exception, "there was insufficient
cause for a precedent-setting transfer of jurisdiction." 67 Both
soldiers were subsequently acquitted by military juries. 168
The death of the two girls became a focal point for Korean
resentment towards the U.S. military presence in the ROK, and
the invocation of the Korea SOFA to defend the outcome only
intensified anti-U.S. feelings among the public. 69 The wave of
164. South Korea Agrees Damages for Families of Victims of US Forces Accident, BBC
Worldwide Monitoring, Jul. 20, 2002, available at LexisNexis AllNews Database and on
file with Author (stating that each family received as compensation the approximate
amount of US$150,000 in Korean Won, seventy-five percent of which was paid by the
United States).
165. See Paul Wiseman, U.S.-South Korea Relations May Sway Election, USA TODAY,
Dec. 19, 2002, at 16A (reporting on how Koreans near the accident felt responsibility
should be attributed higher in the command chain but that the U.S. inquiry attributed
the accident to faulty communication equipment alone).
166. See Lee, supra note 23, at 215 (stating that the United States "reluctantly
charged" the soldiers with negligent homicide after Koreans organized mass protests);
Richard Halloran, Editorial, The Rising East: Growing Anti-Americanism Festers in South
21,
2002,
6,
available at
STAR-BULLETIN,
Jul.
Korea, HONOLULU
http://archives.starbulletin.com/2002/07/21/editorial/halloran.html (stating that U.S.
military authorities initially declined to prosecute the men involved but changed face in
reaction to public pressure).
167. U.S. Refuses Korean Justice For Soldiers, BBC NEWS, Aug. 7, 2002,
(quoting U.S. Force Korea
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/asia-pacific/2178156.stm
Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Daniel Zanini); see also Lee, supra note 23, at 215
(stating that the ROK request for waiver of U.S. jurisdiction in 2002 was the first in the
history of the Korea SOFA).
168. See Korean Anger as US. Soldiers Cleared, BBC NEWS, Nov. 22, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/asia-pacific/2497947.stm.
169. See BAKER, supra note 39, 163-64 (describing that for many Koreans the
tragedy became emblematic of the unacceptable burden imposed by the U.S. military
presence and the problems with the Korea SOFA).
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anti-U.S. protests following the acquittals factored significantly in
Roh Moo-Hyun's victory in the ROK presidential election in
December 2002, who structured his campaign around greater
equality in the U.S.-ROK alliance and SOFA reform. 170 The
United States resisted calls to reform the Korea SOFA, but
pledged to work with the ROK to improve the operation of the
17 1
agreement.
The aftermath of the accident typifies how the asymmetrical
implementation of criminal jurisdiction under SOFAs can
produce negative political ramifications between the sending and
receiving states. It also highlights the limited ability of the ROK
to hold the official duty process to account; the certification is
essentially a fait accompli. The asymmetry and ambiguity of the
official duty certification process, as well as the initial
unwillingness to pursue charges against the men responsible,
illustrates how the current implementation of criminal
jurisdiction under the Korea SOFA can frustrate the
administration of justice for victims of misconduct by U.S.
soldiers.
These concerns are exacerbated by the ROK's longstanding
deference towards the United States in the operation of the
waiver exception provisions. A study from 1979 showed that the
ROK waived jurisdiction in 21,195 of 23,723 cases of crimes
committed by U.S. servicemen between 1967 and 1978, and
chose to exercise primary jurisdiction in 177 cases, a figure that
represents 0.83 percent of the total number of cases. 172 The 1991
and 2001 amendments, and also the 2002 minesweeper incident,
170. See MARK E. MANYIN, U.S. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SOUTH KOREAN POLrnCS
AND RISING "ANTI-AMERICANISM": IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA

1-2 (2003), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/27530.pdf
(stating that Roh's electoral campaign benefitted from massive demonstrations in late
2002 protesting the acquittals); Kirk, supra note 161 (reporting that Roh campaigned on
platform of greater control over U.S. personnel and SOFA renegotiations).
171. See, e.g., Embassy of the United States in Seoul, Korea, The June 13 Accident- Q's
and A's, Question 10, http://seoul.usembassy.gov/junel3acc.html (last visited Nov. 22,
2009) (providing that no changes to the ROK SOFA would have prevented the accident
and that the United States committed a joint task force to improve operation of the
agreement).
172. Soon Sung Cho, Status of Forces Agreement Between the Republic of Korea and The
United States: Problems of Due Process and Fair Trial of U.S. Military Personne in U.S. STATUS
OF FORCES AGREEMENTS WITH ASIAN COUNTRIES: SELECTED STUDIES 49, 55 (Charles L.
Cochran & Hungdah Chiu eds., 1979) (citing a report by the Korean government on
crimes committed by U.S. soldiers).
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appear to have had little effect on the ROK's reluctance to
prosecute offenses committed by U.S. forces. In 2003, the pacific
edition of Stars and Stripes, the daily newspaper for the U.S.
military, reported that the ROK "typically defers jurisdiction to
[U.S. military authorities] except in high-profile cases." 173 Citing
figures from U.S. military authorities, the report noted that the
ROK had primary jurisdiction in over 300 crimes committed by
U.S. personnel in the ROK in 2002, but elected to prosecute only
174
twenty cases.
Even when Korean authorities exercise jurisdiction over the
offending U.S. soldier, the punishment imposed often amounts
to no more than "a slap on the wrist." 175 Between 2004 and 2006,
Korean authorities investigated 718 incidents involving U.S.
servicemen, yet only six U.S. servicemen were serving sentences
in Korean prisons as of April 2007.176 One commentator
complained that U.S. servicemen detained by Korean authorities
are housed in prisons "especially remodeled to meet the
77
standards of third-class American hotels."']
Under the waiver exception, the United States always
requests that the ROK waive its primary jurisdiction, even for
cases that involve off-duty offenses. The ROK almost always
complies with such requests, whether out of custom or because of
an asymmetrical bargaining position.1 78 Commentators have
rightly pointed out that a waiver of jurisdiction is meant to
transfer adjudicatory jurisdiction to the requesting state to
facilitate proper disposition of the offending soldier. 79 In
173. Jeremy Kirk & Choe Song-won, S. Korea Still PonderingHit-and-runCase, STARS
&
STRIPES,
Dec.
13,
2003,
available
at
http://www.stripes.com/
article.asp?section=104&article=1 8478&archive=true.
174. See id.
175. Jung & Hwang, supra note 35, at 1131; see also Ernest V. Harris, The Judicial
Dilemma O'Callahan v. Parker Presents to SOFAs, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 164, 174
(1973) (providing examples of lenient treatment of U.S. personnel by Korean courts,
including an instance where a defendant was "fined only $110.00 for negligent
homicide"); Fisher, supra note 159 ("'[U.S. servicemembers] get lenient punishment,
absolutely, I can tell you that,' said Kim Jong-pyo, an attorney in Seoul.").
176. See Fisher, supra note 159.
177. Cho, supra note 172, at 55.
178. See supranotes 127, 155 and accompanying text.
179. SeeJung & Hwang, supra note 35, at 1129 (explaining that waiver provisions
are meant to allow the requesting state to try and punish the offenders and not to
immunize them from prosecution); see also Lazareff, supra note 70, at 203 (stating a
waiver ofjurisdiction is meant to ensure thatjustice is done and the offender is tried).
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practice, however, the waiver exception of the Korea SOFA
appears to have achieved the opposite effect.
To their credit, in recent years U.S. military authorities have
taken measures to reduce the incidence of criminal offenses by
U.S. soldiers in the ROK-180 Nonetheless, potential problems with
jurisdiction linger and the policy to maximize jurisdiction
remains largely unchanged. 18 1 The following section discusses in
greater detail how this phenomenon can entail a conflict of
obligations between the Korea SOFA and the ICCPR.
3.

Examining the Conflicting Obligations of the Korea SOFA
and the ICCPR

If victims of crimes committed on Korean territory by U.S.
service members are not afforded an effective legal remedy, the
ROK will fail to satisfy its obligations under article 2 of the
182
ICCPR, regardless of the identity of the alleged perpetrator.
But for the Korea SOFA, the ROK would have exclusive
jurisdictional authority to prosecute crimes committed by U.S.
soldiers on its territory.
Two features of the Korea SOFA raise particular concerns.
First, official duty determinations are solely within the province
of the United States and cannot be effectively questioned by
Korean authorities under the terms of the Korea SOFA. 183 This
permits the United States to unilaterally delimit the extent to
which Korean jurisdiction applies to the acts of its personnel.
Second, the United States always requests for a waiver of

180. See Ashley Rowland, Crime Reports Up in South Korea After Curfew Eased, STARS &
STRIPES,
Apr.
3,
2009,
available
at
http://www.stripes.com/
article.asp?section=104&article=617 6 8 (reporting on renewed curfew hours imposed by
U.S. military authorities to curb off-duty crimes by U.S. soldiers); Crimes by Foreigners
Jump 48% in 2004, KOREA TIMES, Feb. 12, 2005 (attributing decrease in crimes by U.S.
soldiers to tighter control by U.S. military authorities in response to anti-U.S. sentiment
after the 2002 minesweeper accident).
181. See U.S. Forces Korea Reg. No. 1-44, CriminalJurisdictionUnder Art XXII, Status
7(f)
(Mar.
1,
2010),
available
at
of Forces Agreement,
1
5(b),
http://8tharmy.korea.army.mil/gl-ag/programs-policy/publicationsrecords/
regulations/usfk/usfk/USFK Reg 1-44 Criminal Jurisdiction Under Art XXII, SOFA.pdf
(stating that current U.S. policy is to maximize jurisdiction over foreign criminal cases
and that commanders are to consult with U.S. Ambassador to Korea as to whether
waivers ofjurisdiction should be requested).
182. See supra note 115.
183. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction from the RO, and the proportion of waivers of
18 4
jurisdiction granted overwhelmingly favors the United States.
The United States retains jurisdiction in both situations, but
the ROK receives no substantial guarantee that U.S. military
authorities will investigate cases in an appropriate and impartial
185
fashion or provide effective remedies where necessary.
Moreover, U.S. military personnel often receive light sanctions in
relation to the severity of their crimes. 18 6 This undermines the
effective remedy requirement contemplated under article 2(3) of
the ICCPR. It is also important to note that the "effective
remedy" provision is the primary means by which the rights
87
recognized within the ICCPR are secured.
Irrespective of the Korea SOFA, the ROK continues to be
bound by its obligations under article 2 of the ICCPR as a state
party to that agreement. Although human rights treaties recontextualized part of the discourse-from the protection of
state sovereignty to the protection of persons-the protection of
individual rights is still primarily situated within a domestic legal
framework. 8 8 Pursuant to the international law principle
mandating exhaustion of domestic remedies, the ROK must be
the first guarantor of covenant rights for Korean nationals when
their rights are affected. 8 9 When the ROK waives its primary
jurisdiction pursuant to the Korea SOFA, however, it no longer
has jurisdiction to retain custody over the perpetrators,
investigate the allegations, or provide an effective remedy to
aggrieved individuals under article 2(3). If the United States
subsequently neglects to pursue effective investigations, develop a
judicial remedy, or otherwise see that justice is done, individuals
who have suffered such violations can claim no effective remedy.
Under these circumstances, does the ROK have a duty to
implement the Korea SOFA in a manner consistent with its
ICCPR obligations? In light of its policy to maximize jurisdiction
over its soldiers, is the United States responsible for the failure to
184. See supranotes 172-79 and accompanying text.
185. See Lazareff, supra note 70, at 264 (criticizing generally the operation of waiver
provisions in SOFAs and stating that grant of waiver should be subject to criminal
proceedings being taken by the state in whose favor the waiver is granted).
186. See supranotes 76-78 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 113-14.
188. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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secure effective remedies to Korean individuals injured by the
crimes of U.S. soldiers? The issues here may be restated as two
questions of international law. First, if the implementation of the
Korea SOFA frustrates article 2 of the ICCPR, which treaty should
take precedence, and what are the ROK's obligations to improve
the operation of the Korea SOFA? Second, are U.S. obligations
under article 2 engaged when U.S. personnel violate the rights of
individuals who are neither subject to U.S. jurisdiction nor within
U.S. territory? These questions, and the means to resolve them
under international law, are the subject of Part II.
II. APPROACHES TOWARD HARMONIZING THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN SOFAS AND THE ICCPR
Complying with the Korea SOFA leaves the ROK in potential
violation of its ICCPR obligations. Treating this as a breach of
international law by the ROK alone, however, fails to address the
reality of the situation. First, but for the Korea SOFA, the ROK
would be able to prosecute U.S. soldiers for breaking Korean law,
thereby vindicating any rights that have been violated. Second,
aside from diplomatic channels, the ROK has no means of legal
redress under the Korea SOFA if the United States fails to take
adequate measures to investigate or prosecute offenses.
This Note argues that any resolution of this problem in
international law must necessarily have two prongs, because both
ROK and U.S. obligations under the ICCPR are engaged. Each
prong implicates a different aspect of the problem and a
different solution, with accordingly different implications for
receiving states and sending states in general. Part II.A explores
how competing treaty obligations between human rights treaties
and other international agreements can be resolved, with an eye
to accommodating the ROK's treaty obligations under both the
Korea SOFA and the ICCPR. Part II.B analyzes the nature of the
legal obligation imposed by article 2 of the ICCPR and examines
how the actions of U.S. soldiers in the ROK engage U.S.
obligations under the ICCPR.
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Addressing the Problemfrom the ROK's Angle: Resolving
Competing Treaty Obligations

Any consideration of the competing obligations faced by the
ROK between the Korea SOFA and the ICCPR must begin with
the principles of construction that control when two treaties have
conflicting or incompatible provisions. This Part discusses the
current state of international law on treaty conflicts. Because the
European courts have developed jurisprudence on the issue of
treaty obligations conflicting with human rights treaties, this
Note will first consider the European perspective, and then turn
to the approach adopted by the HRC.
1. Treaty Conflicts: A Theoretical Perspective
To date, experts consider efforts to codify the international
law principles on inconsistent treaty obligations incomplete and
unsatisfactory, particularly where multilateral treaties such as the
ICCPR are concerned. 190 The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties ("VCLT") codifies the law of treaties. 19 1 Article 30 of the
VCLT attempts to address conflicting treaty provisions with a lastin-time rule: as between two successive treaties with the same
parties, covering the same subject matter, the earlier treaty is
binding "only to the extent that its provisions are compatible
1 92
with those of the later treaty."
When two successive treaties do not cover the same subject,
however, the VCLT is silent on a principle of construction. The
VCLT addresses neither the level of generality that the phrase
"same subject matter" should be understood, nor whether
individual provisions that have the same subject matter should
also be construed under article 30.193 It is evident that article 30
190. See MALGOStA FITZMAURICE & OLUFEMI ELIAS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE

LAW OF TREATIES 315-16 (2005) (remarking that the current state of treaty conflict rules
for multilateral treaties is widely considered unsatisfactory); see alsoJohn E. Parkerson,
Jr. & Carolyn S. Stoehr, The U.S. Military Death Penalty in Europe: Threats from Recent
European Human Rights Developments, 129 MIL. L. REv. 41, 71-72 (1990) (stating that
courts addressing treaty conflicts "will be faced with a construction decision where there

is no clear principle of international law").
191. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT].
192. Id. art. 30(3).
193. See Parkerson & Stoehr, supra note 190, at 71 ("It is not entirely clear whether
'the same subject matter' of article 30 refers only to entire treaties dealing with the same
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of the VCLT is incomplete where resolving conflicts between
treaty norms are concerned. 194 A simple last-in-time rule,
moreover, produces particularly unsatisfactory results with
human rights treaties; such treaties represent fundamental
norms that privilege the rights of the individual as human beings,
over and above other international obligations that states parties
may have. 195 Commentators have argued that conflicts arising
between human rights treaties and other types of international
agreements should be addressed with something more than a lex
196
posterior rule.
More recently, Professor S.A. Sadat-Akhavi has provided
some insight into understanding the problem of incompatible
treaty obligations. Two treaties conflict when compliance with
the norms of one treaty puts a state in breach of another treaty to
which it is a party. 197 A conflict is partial rather than total,
however, when treaty norms conflict only under certain
circumstances. 198 Sadat-Akhavi distinguishes between a real and a
false conflict: a conflict between treaties is false when an alternate
implementation of their provisions exists whereby all their terms

subject matter or whether it might also apply to provisions concerning the same subject
matter in treaties that, as a whole, pertain to different matters."); see also SAYED ALl
SADAT-AKHAVI, METHODS OF RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN TREATIES 80-84 (2003)
(discussing how Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT") does not address
how to determine what constitutes a later treaty, does not account for the position of
regional treaties, or for treaties containing obligations erga omnes).
194. See FITZMAURICE & ELIAS, supra note 190, at 315 (commenting that article 30
of the VCLT "does not provide all the answers" for potential treaty conflicts).
195. See SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 193, at 83 (distinguishing human rights treaties
from other treaties because they emphasize "the protection of human beings" over "the
mutual obligations of States"); see also supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing
how human rights treaties represent fundamental values).
196. Sadat-Akhavi quotes K. Zemanek, who writes:
One may doubt that conflicts of this nature can be resolved by a, however
modified, lex posteriorrule. To put [human rights treaties] on the same footing
and subject them to mechanical rules neglects their different role in [the]
international system. A distinction according to their purposes and to the
values embodied in them should be introduced to protect essential values
which have once been agreed on against infringement.
SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 193, at 83 (internal citations omitted).
197. See id., at 5 (defining any given treaty as "a set of treaty norms" and conflict
arises when compliance with one norm entails noncompliance with the other); see also
Parkerson & Stoehr, supra note 190, at 71-72 (discussing how conflict can occur when a
receiving state's compliance with a SOFA places it in breach of another treaty).
198. See SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 193, at 11.
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can be reconciled. 199 One treaty norm may prohibit one or
several ways of complying with another norm, but they "remain
compatible so long as one norm leaves available at least one
200
manner in which the other norm can be respected."
As the following part discusses, this theoretical foundation is
consistent with the approach adopted by the European courts for
reconciling conflicting treaty norms with human rights treaties.
2.

Examples from European Jurisprudence

European courts have confronted the issue of conflicting
obligations between the European Convention on Human
Rights 20 1 ("ECHR") and two international agreements to which
the United States is a party: the NATO SOFA and the extradition
treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom.
In Soering v. United Kingdom,20 2 the European Court of
Human Rights ("ECtHR") rejected the idea that state obligations
under an extradition treaty should supersede obligations created
by human rights treaties. 20 3 The ECtHR addressed the problem
of extraditing Soering, a West German national, from the United
Kingdom to the United States to face capital murder charges in
the state of Virginia.2 0 4 Soering argued that compliance with the
extradition treaty would subject him to cruel and inhuman
treatment because of the death row phenomenon, 20 5 where a
person could spend years awaiting execution under difficult
206
conditions while the appeals process was exhausted.
The ECtHR took notice of the death row phenomenon, and
found that exposing Soering to such treatment would likely
20 7
exceed the thresholds permitted by article 3 of the ECHR.
199. See id. at 34 (discussing how false conflicts between treaties can be reconciled
when "there is at least one way of complying with all their requirements").
200. Id. at 41.
201. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
202. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
203. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 93, at 914 (summarizing that in Soering the
European Court "rejects the notion that international obligations created by extradition
treaties prevail over human rights obligations.").
204. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 2-8,
11-26.
205. Id. at 38, 76.
206. Id. at 41-43,
106-07.
207. Id. at 44,
111. Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides: "No one shall be subjected to
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Because the extradition treaty permitted the extraditing state to
refuse transfer if the requesting party failed to give adequate
assurances that the death penalty would not be carried out, the
conflict between the extradition treaty and the ECHR is only
partial.20 8 Under the circumstances, however, the ECtHR
determined that, despite the good faith efforts of the United
Kingdom, article 3 was engaged, because the assurances obtained
from the state of Virginia were inadequate to ensure that the
death penalty would not be executed. 20 9 Accordingly, the ECtHR
concluded that because the assurances were inadequate, there
was a real risk of the death penalty being sought and extraditing
Soering under such circumstances would place the United
Kingdom in contravention of its obligations under the ECHR.21 0
In Netherlands v. Short,2 11 the Dutch High Court also
confronted a conflict of obligations: between Netherland's
commitments under the ECHR, and its obligation to transfer
jurisdiction over a U.S. soldier to the United States under the
NATO SOFA.2 12 Short was a U.S. serviceman who was arrested by
Dutch police on suspicion of murdering his Turkish wife while
he was stationed in the Netherlands. 213 The Netherlands was
caught between its obligations under the sixth protocol to the
ECHR 2 4-which bans capital punishment-and the criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the NATO SOFA. Although the NATO
SOFA vested the United States with exclusive jurisdiction over
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." ECHR, supra note 201,
art 3.
208. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12,
36-37 (discussing how the
extradition treaty permits refusal to extradite when assurances that the death penalty
will not be carried out are inadequate).
209. See id. at 38-39,
97, 99.
210. Id. at 44, 111 (holding that extraditing Soering to the United States would
"give rise to a breach of Article 3").
211. Nederlanden/Short, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of
the Netherlands], 30 maart 1990, NJ 249 (ann. A.HJ. Sw) (Neth.), translatedin 29 I.L.M.
1375 and 22 Neth. Y.B. Int'l L. 432 (1991).
212. See Summary of Decision of Hoge Raad, 29 I.L.M. 1375, at 1389, 3.2-.5; see also
Text of Opinion ofAdvocaat-GeneraalStrikwerda, 29 I.L.M. 1375, at 1376, 1.1-.11.
213. See id. at 1388, 1 3.1.; Keith Highet et al., International Decisions - Short v.

Kingdom of the Netherlands, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 698, 699-700 (1991) (recounting facts of
the case).
214. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Apr. 28, 1988,
Eur. T.S. No. 114 ("[The] death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned
to such penalty or executed.").
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Short, the Dutch refused to comply with the NATO SOFA
because they believed that turning Short over to U.S. authorities
could subject him to the death penalty, and put the Dutch in
violation
of the
ECHR's
prohibition
against capital
punishment. 2 5 The Dutch relinquished custody only after the
United States agreed not to seek the death penalty on the basis of
21 6
Short's mental incapacity.
Soering and Short have been recognized as contributions to a
limited but developing jurisprudence with ramifications for cases
where a state party to a human rights treaty is faced with the
removal of an individual from its jurisdiction. 217 These
precedents indicate that states will be liable for any human rights
violations that follow as a result of complying with another
agreement, such as a SOFA, and that receiving states will be less
likely to respond to U.S. demands without adequate assurances
that the United States will respect their human rights
undertakings. 21 8 These cases also demonstrate that total conflict
between two treaties is rare, and where conflict is partial, the
measures taken to reconcile the two competing obligations must
conform to the standards of the human rights treaty.
A more recent example of this developing jurisprudence
centers on the U.S. use of European military sites in the practice
of extraordinary rendition. In 2006, the European Parliament
established a temporary committee to examine the participation
of European nations in the transportation and detention of
prisoners by the United States, including states that are party to
215. See Highet et al., supra note 213, at 700 (describing the Dutch position).
216. See Erik Rosenfeld, Application of U.S. Status of Forces Agreements to Article 98 of
the Rome Statute, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 273, 287 (2003) (stating that Short
was released after the United States informed the Dutch that the death penalty was not
applicable to him); see also Eichelman, supra note 157, at 30-31 (noting that the
distinction between the United States not seeking the death penalty due to Short's
psychiatric state and waiving its right to seek the death penalty as per the Dutch request
is a narrow one).
217. See Richard B. Lillich, Note, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 128, 142-43
(1991) (observing that Soering has far-reaching implications beyond the extradition
context); see also Highet et al., supra note 213, at 702 (stating that Short is consistent with
Lillich's view on Soering); Ruppert, supra note 57, at 46 (arguing that Short illustrates a
relatively small sovereign's ability to disregard SOFA obligations in light of a conflicting

treaty).
218. See Ruppert, supra note 57, at 46 (stating that these cases indicate "host
nations are less likely to be more generous to U.S. interests than a SOFA requires when a
conflict exists with another treaty obligation or a nation's sense of values.").
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the NATO SOFA.219 In its submission to the temporary
committee, the International Commission of Jurists22 0 pointed
out:
Where the base was subject to a SOFA, or other legal
agreement, which prevented entry on, search of, or
otherwise inhibited effective investigation of the allegations,
the positive obligation on the State would include an
obligation to seek renegotiation of the agreement, or where
this was not possible, to refuse to renew the agreement
on
2 21
terms which failed to allow for effective investigations.
This position was subsequently adopted in a formal
22 2
resolution of the European Parliament.
The examples from Europe indicate that the obligations of
human rights treaties like the ICCPR represent fundamental
transnational norms, and should be treated as imposing a
minimum level of state obligations to individuals. The European
approach provides an example of how human rights obligations
and SOFAS can be reconciled through assertive action by the
receiving state, and is instructive for the ROK's context. 223 While
the HRC's jurisprudence is not as extensive in this area of
219. See generally European Parliament Decision Setting Up a Temporary
Committee on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the
Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, 2006 O.J. C 287 E/159.
220. The International Commission of Jurists is a nongovernmental organization
composed of a standing group of over sixty eminent jurists, and has distinguished itself
with its authoritative legal positions on human rights and the promotion of rule of law.
For more information on the commission's composition and activities, see Int'l Comm'n
of Jurists, About Us, http://www.icj.org/rubrique.php3?id-rubrique=ll&lang=en (last
visited Mar. 10, 2010).
221. Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, Submission to European Parliament Temporary Committee
on Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportationand Illegal Detention of
Prisoners (TDIP) 9 (Nov. 20, 2006),
available at http://www.icj.org/IMG/
TDIPFINAL.pdf. The commission reiterated this position in a subsequent submission to
the Committee Against Torture, the supervisory body for the U.N. Convention Against
Torture, on the status of Poland's obligations under the NATO SOFA with regard to CIA
renditions. According to the commission, Poland's human rights obligations included
article 2 of the ICCPR, and when the NATO SOFA agreement impeded effective
enforcement of those fights, Poland had a positive obligation to seek renegotiation or
even refuse to renew the agreement if it failed to allow for effective investigations. See
Int'l Comm'n ofJurists, Open Letter to Committee Against Torture 4 (May 7, 2007), available
at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/ngos/icj.pdf.
222. See European Parliament Resolution of 14 February 2007 on the Alleged Use
of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of
Prisoners, 2007 O.J. C 287 E/309, at 325.
223. See infra Part III.A.
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inquiry, the general articulation of fundamental, nonderogable
norms accords with the European approach.
3.

The Approach of the Human Rights Committee

This Part turns to the approach of the HRC regarding the
fundamental, nonderogable norms codified in the ICCPR. The
HRC has not specifically addressed the issue of whether the
ICCPR should preempt inconsistent treaties. Within the context
of extradition treaties, however, the general approach adopted by
the HRC with regard to incompatible treaty obligations is
consistent with that of the ECtHR.
In Ng v. Canada,224 the HRC found Canada to have violated
ICCPR article 7 's prohibition against cruel and inhuman
treatment, when it extradited Mr. Ng to California without
seeking or receiving assurances from the United States that he
would not be subject to execution by gas chamber. 225 The HRC
recognized that state parties will often have other bilateral treaty
obligations, but emphasized that such obligations must be
implemented in a way that is consistent with the guarantees of
the ICCPR, particularly with article 2(1).226 The method
advocated by the HRC for curing this incompatibility is consistent
with the European approach: the extraditing state must obtain an
undertaking from the requesting state that the individual being
extradited will not be subjected to treatment that violates a
22 7
substantive right under the ICCPR.
The priority of the ICCPR over other international
obligations can also be inferred from the principle of
nondenunciation. No state party may repudiate its obligations
under the ICCPR in favor of its obligations under another treaty,
because the ICCPR has no provision regarding its termination,
does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal, and permits no
implications of a right of denunciation. 228 This follows from the

224. HRC, Communication No. 469/1991: Views of the Human Rights Committee Under
Article 5, Paragraph4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
PoliticalRights (Ng v. Canada), U.N. Doc. ICCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (Jan. 7, 1994).
225. See id. 16.4.
226. See id. 14.1.
227. Seeid. 16.4.
228. HRC, General Comment No. 26: Continuity of Obligations, 44 3-5, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21 /Rev. 1/Add.8/Rev.1 (Aug. 12, 1997).

630

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 33:585

inherent nature of the ICCPR as implementing the fundamental
guarantees of the UDHR:
[T] he Covenant codifies in treaty form the universal human
rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights ... [a]s such, the Covenant does not have a
temporary character typical of treaties where a right of
denunciation is deemed to be admitted, notwithstanding
the
229
absence of a specific provision to that effect.
The HRC has stated unequivocally that article 2 represents
norms so integral to the object and purpose of the ICCPR that no
state party may reserve or limit their applicability. 230 Therefore,
the obligations imposed on state parties by the ICCPR continue
to apply regardless of other agreements that the state parties may
have entered into with other parties. On this reasoning, a
temporary basing agreement such as the Korea SOFA should not
prevent a state party from giving effect to the rights codified in
231
the ICCPR.
B.

Engaging U.S. Obligations UnderICCPR Article 2

The foregoing discussion of the ROK's competing treaty
obligations shows that receiving states must observe the standards
of the ICCPR as they implement their SOFA obligations. The
question then arises as to whether a sending state's obligations
under the ICCPR affect their ability to negotiate, execute, and
implement SOFAs. Under the prevailing interpretation of the
ICCPR, state parties are not absolved of responsibility for actions
taken by their agents or representatives that happen to occur
outside their sovereign territory. 232 As this Part explains, this
general rule has significant implications for sending states like
the United States.
1. Structural Obligations Surrounding the ICCPR
Before turning to a detailed discussion of ICCPR article 2,
two structural considerations that influence the interpretation
229. Id.

3.

230. General Comment 24, supra note 100,
9, 11 (noting that guarantees such as
article 2(3) provide the necessary framework for the covenant and are "essential to its
object and purpose").
231. See supra note 100, 195-196, and accompanying text.
232. See infra notes 246-59 and accompanying text.
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and implementation of the ICCPR must be addressed. The first
of these structural obligations is the VCLT, which is recognized
233
as encapsulating well-settled principles of treaty construction.
The VCLT provides the substantive canons of construction for
the ICCPR, as it does for all other treaties. According to the
HRC:
Article 2 defines the scope of the legal obligations
undertaken by States Parties to the Covenant.... Pursuant to
the principle articulated in article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, States Parties are
required to give effect to the obligations under the Covenant
234
in good faith.
Tracking the obligation of good faith performance is the
general rule of interpretation that treaties be construed in good
faith, taking into account "any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties." 235 Under
international law, states are obliged not to frustrate or
undermine the object and purpose of a treaty when it is a
signatory. 236 Therefore, both the United States and the ROK
must consider their obligations under international law as state
parties to the ICCPR when implementing the provisions of the
Korea SOFA.
The second structural obligation is derived from the nature
of the ICCPR itself. As a multi-lateral treaty, the ICCPR is a
233. The United States has signed but not ratified the VCLT. Nonetheless, the
United States accepts the VCLT as reflecting CIL on treaty application and
interpretation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, §102 cmt. f (1987); see also U.S. Dep't of State, International Legal Authorities,
http://www.state.gov/s/I/treaty/authorities/international
(stating that the United
States has yet to ratify the VCLT but nonetheless adheres to many VCLT rules for
treaties) (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
234. General Comment 31, supra note 106,
3. VCLT article 26 states, "'Pacta sunt
servanda' Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith." VCLT, supra note 191, art. 26.
235. VCLT, supra note 191, art. 31 (3) (c). In determining the purpose and context
of the treaty, suitable recourse may be had to the preamble and annexes of the treaty. Id.
art. 31(2).
236. See VCLT, supra note 191, art. 18 ("A State is obliged to refrain from acts
which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty
or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance
or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the
treaty; or (b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry
into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.").
Id. art. 18.
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document that sets out to establish a transnational community of
mutual interests and obligations. 237 The HRC has stated:
While article 2 is couched in terms of the obligations of State
Parties towards individuals as the right-holders under the
Covenant, every State Party has a legal interest in the
performance by every other State Party of its obligations.
...IT]he 'rules concerning the basic rights of the human
person' are erga omnes obligations ....Furthermore, the
contractual dimension of the treaty involves any State Party
to a treaty being obligated to every other State Party to
238
comply with its undertakings under the treaty.
This language from the HRC indicates that article 2 imposes
an obligation on state parties that runs to the international
community as a whole. Accordingly, state parties have a duty not
to interfere with another state party's performance of its
obligations under the ICCPR. The U.S. policy of maximizing
jurisdiction under the Korea SOFA would fail on this criterion,
because the policy hinders the ROK's ability to comply with its
obligations under article 2.
These background norms for the operation of the ICCPR
impose an affirmative obligation on the United States to refrain
from those actions that frustrate the operation of the covenant.
They do not, however, address the issue of whether the U.S.
obligations under article 2 are actually engaged by its actions in
the ROK For that, the discussion must turn to whether article 2
applies extraterritorially to U.S. actions in the ROK.
2.

The Extraterritorial Scope of Article 2

A state party's duty to protect individual rights under article
2 of the ICCPR runs to all persons "within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction." 239 Explication of this phrase is crucial
for determining the nature of the obligations undertaken by state
parties, especially with regard to its applicability beyond
territorial boundaries. The crux of the issue is whether the
2 4°
phrase "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction"
should be construed conjunctively or disjunctively.
237. See ICCPR, supra note 26, pmbl.
238. General Comment 31, supra note 106,

239. ICCPR, supranote 26, art. 2(1).
240. Md (emphasis added).

2 (italics omitted).
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The U.S. position has been, and continues to be, that the
plain meaning of the phrase indicates that the individual must be
24 1
both within the state's territory, and subject to its jurisdiction.
Leading commentators argue that a bona-fide implementation of
international human rights treaties, one that is loyal to their
object and purposes, will accept the extraterritorial reach of
those obligations. 242 Reading article 2(1) in this way also creates
problems for numerous substantive rights defined under the
ICCPR, and frustrates the object and purpose of the treaty. 243 For
example, article 12(4) states that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of the right to enter his own country." 244 This right
would be devoid of meaning were the conjunctive reading to
control, because the only time it could be exercised is when an
245
individual is outside of the territory of its state.
Instead, the HRC endorses the disjunctive reading of "and"
in article 2(1), giving the ICCPR extraterritorial scope. 246 This
means that a state party must respect and ensure the rights laid
down in the covenant to anyone within the power or effective
control of that state party, even if not situated within the territory

241. See Matthew Waxman, Principal Deputy Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of
State, Opening Statement on the Report Concerning the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights to U.N. Human Rights Committee (July 17, 2006), available at
http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/70392.htm.
But
see
Theodor
Meron,
Extraterritorialityof Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 79 (1994) (stating that
the legislative history of article 2(1) does not support a narrow territorial construction).
242. See, e.g., Meron, supra note 241, at 82 ("Bona fide interpretation of human
rights treaties by the administration and the courts is called for, in accordance with their
object and purpose of promoting human rights, even where such interpretation leads to
the extraterritoriality of humanitarian obligations of the United States."); see also VCLT,
supra note 192, art. 29 ("Unless a different intention appearsfrom the treaty or is otherwise
established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory.")
(emphasis added).
243. See Meron, supra note 241, at 82 ("Narrow territorial interpretation of human
rights treaties is anathema to the basic idea of human rights."); see also McGoldrick,
supra note 108, at 48 (stating that while the conjunctive reading is "undoubtedly the
more natural one" it is nonetheless "manifestly absurd").
244. ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 12(4).
245. See McGoldrick, supra note 108, at 48 (stating that the disjunctive construction
is more sensible in light of the goals of the ICCPR).
246. See General Comment 31, supra note 106, 10. But see NOWAK, supra note 98, at
43 n.78 (arguing for a restrained reading of the disjunctive construction because states
are not responsible for all violations on their territory, e.g. those committed by
insurgents or by occupation forces).
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of the state party.247 As such, the United States has a general legal
obligation to guarantee the covenant rights of Koreans if they
are, for example, on U.S. military bases in the ROK (such as
hired workers or independent contractors). 248 A failure to ensure
covenant rights can rise to a violation of those rights by the
United States if it does not "take appropriate measures or
[exercise] due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress
249
the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities."
Any territorial focus is further eroded, moreover, because article
2 imposes on state parties a duty to assist each other in bringing
to justice persons suspected of having committed acts in violation
of the Covenant that are punishable under domestic or
250
international law.
There is substantial support for the idea that state parties
must safeguard the rights recognized in the covenant and
observe their obligations while they are acting abroad. 25 1 The
HRC has emphasized, within the context of a state party
committing violations of the covenant against its overseas
citizens, that "it would be unconscionable to so interpret the
responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State
party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of
another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own
territory." 252 It thus follows that the state duty to take adequate
measures to bring to justice private perpetrators of covenant
247. See General Comment 31, supra note 106,
10 (noting that state parties are
required by article 2(1) to guarantee the rights of those individuals subject to the
effective control of their forces acting outside their territory, regardless of how such
control is obtained).
248. Cf Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480-81 (2004) (recognizing that the exercise
of effective and exclusive control by U.S. instrumentalities over U.S. overseas bases
expands U.S. jurisdiction beyond its territorial borders).
249. General Comment 31, supra note 106, 1 8; cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 711 cmt. e (1987) (indicating that
states are responsible under international law for failing to provide remedies to foreign
individuals for injuries inflicted by either state or private individuals for instances where
"a remedy would be provided by the major legal systems of the world").
250. See General Comment 31, supra note 106, 18.
251. See NOWAK, supra note 98, at 44 (stating that it would be contrary to the
purpose of the Covenant if state parties were not responsible for actions taken on
foreign territory that violate the rights of persons subject to their authority).
252. HRC, Communication No. 52/1979: Views of the Human Rights Committee Under
Article 5, Paragraph4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Saldias
de
Lopez
v.
Uruguay),
12.3,
U.N.
Doc.
CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 (Jul. 29, 1981).
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violations should apply with even greater force to offenses
253
committed by state actors in the territory of another state.
Some ambiguity remains, however, as to whether U.S.
obligations under article 2 are engaged when individuals not
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States suffer rights
violations at the hands of U.S. soldiers. As the next Part discusses,
however, HRC jurisprudence indicates that the ICCPR applies to
rights violations attributed to a state party's agents acting
overseas, regardless of the nationality of the individuals
concerned.
3.

Subsequent Practice by the Human Rights Committee

To date, the general approach adopted by the HRC is that
the scope of the ICCPR applies to the actions of state parties
when they act abroad. On a number of occasions, the HRC has
questioned states on the application of article 2(1) with respect
to situations where members of its armed forces have committed
offenses against foreign nationals while deployed outside their
25 4
sovereign territory.
During its consideration of Belgium's third periodic report
under the ICCPR in 1998, the HRC raised the applicability of the
covenant with regard to Belgium's deployment of peacekeepers
in Somalia. 255 Typically, the U.N. concludes a SOFA with the state

253. See id. 12.1; see also Meron, supra note 241, at 79 (observing that in Saldias
the HRC stated that article 2(1) carries no implication that state parties would not be
liable for violations committed by their agents on the territory of another state).
254. See, e.g., HRC, Summary Record of the 2317th meeting: Consideration of the Fifth
Periodic Report of Italy, 17, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.2317 (Oct. 26, 2005) (endorsing the
Italian view that the scope of the ICCPR applied to Italian peacekeeping actions
abroad); see also McGoldrick, supra note 108, at 63-65 (discussing HRC sentiment
toward the applicability of Covenant obligations in the context of overseas military
actions by Belgium, Israel, and Croatia).
255. See HRC, Summary Record of the 1707th meeting: Considerationof Third Periodic
Report of Belgium, 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1707 (Oct. 27, 1998) [hereinafter Third
Periodic Report-Belgium]; see also HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights

Committee: Belgium,

14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.99 (Nov. 19, 1998) (stating that

the Belgian peacekeepers had been acting under the aegis of United Nations Operation
in Somalia ("UNOSOM II")). It should be noted in this connection that the Korean War
and the subsequent U.S. presence on the Korean peninsula were sanctioned by U.N.
Security Council Resolution as peace enforcement actions under chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter. See, e.g., Timm, supra note 52, at 443-44 (stating that the Korean War was the
first chapter VII enforcement action and discussing the various Security Council
resolutions).
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receiving peacekeepers based on the Model SOFA for
peacekeeping operations adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly. 256 Due to the collapse of governmental and
administrative functions in Somalia, however, no SOFA could be
257
negotiated or concluded.
The HRC questioned the suspended sentences imposed by
the Belgian military authorities for offenses committed against
the local population by Belgian peacekeepers. 258 Some of these
offenses were particularly egregious: "force-feeding a Muslim
child with pork until it vomited, tying a Somali child to a vehicle
and ordering the vehicle to drive off, procuring and offering a
teenage Somali girl as a present at a birthday party, and acts of
public indecency." 259 Taking notice of the fact that the stresses of
overseas deployment meant that soldiers developed a different
mentality from citizens, the HRC stated that the Belgian
Government had the "fundamental duty" to ensure that its
26°
soldiers conformed to "responsible and humane" behavior.
Addressing concerns as to how Belgium's obligations under
the ICCPR were engaged when Belgium peacekeepers acted
outside their sovereign territory, the HRC emphasized that
"there could be no doubt that actions carried out by Belgium's
agents in another country fell within the scope of the
Covenant."2 6 1 Moreover, the HRC recognized the applicability of
Belgian jurisdiction to the rights violations committed by the
256. Report of the Secretary General, Model Status of Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations, 1, U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (Oct. 9, 1990) [hereinafter U.N. SOFA].
The U.N. SOFA is far more favorable to the sending state than the Korea SOFA or the
NATO SOFA; the sending state enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over any criminal offense
that may be committed by their personnel while deployed as peacekeepers. See Michael
Bothe & Thomas Dorschel, The UN Peacekeeping Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF VISITING FORCES 487, 505 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2001) (stating that the U.N. SOFA
gives military members of a peacekeeping operation complete immunity from the
receiving state's criminal jurisdiction); Rosenfeld, supra note 216, at 290 (noting that the
U.N. SOFA gives U.S. soldiers greater protection than other SOFAs and this
arrangement is meant to encourage U.N. member states to contribute peacekeepers).
257. See Bothe & Dorschel, supra note 256, at 493 n.27 (citing UNOSOM II as an
instance where no SOFA was concluded because no government was in place); Susan S.
Gibson, Lack of Extraterritorial
Jurisdictionover Civilians:A New Look at an Old Problem, 148
MIL. L. REv. 114, 157 (1995) (noting that Somalia had no government capable of
concluding a SOFA).
258. Third Periodic Report-Belgium, supra note 255, 3.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.1 2.

20101

BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE

637

Belgian peacekeepers against the Somalis, taking issue with the
suspended sentences imposed on the Belgian peacekeepers. 262 In
response, Belgium accepted the applicability of the covenant with
respect to the actions of its peace-keepers in Somalia, noting that
jurisdiction had been transferred from military tribunals to the
regular judiciary, and that investigations into the allegations of
263
wrongdoing were taking place.
This exchange between the HRC and the Belgium
delegation carries great significance, because it demonstrates
that the affirmative duties to investigate and to bring to justice
alleged perpetrators of covenant violations, attaches to
jurisdiction over the perpetrator and not to jurisdiction over the
victim. The victims were neither within Belgian territory, nor
subject to Belgian jurisdiction in the conventional sense because
they were Somali nationals, and the situs of the alleged crimes
was Somalia. 264 Nonetheless, the HRC recognized that Belgium's
ICCPR obligations were engaged when Belgian peacekeepers
265
violated covenant rights in Somalia.
The general rule adopted by the HRC, then, is that when a
state party to the ICCPR deploys its forces overseas, it continues
to have affirmative duties to provide effective remedies for any
violation of covenant rights committed by its troops, regardless of
whether they have jurisdiction over the aggrieved individual. As
Part III.B discusses, this general rule has important ramifications
for the disposition of crimes committed by U.S. forces in the
ROK and elsewhere.
III. FROM STATE CONSENT TO GLOBAL RULE OF LA W
THE UNIVERSAL DUTY "TO RESPECTAND TO ENSURE"
Developments in human rights law are imposing greater
obligations on states to respect and to ensure individual rights.
State parties to the ICCPR must respect these constraints in the
262. Id. 3 (observing that in all cases the Belgium military courts "had imposed
only suspended sentences").
263. Id. 1 22 ("Irrespective of where an act was committed, Belgian jurisdiction
applied, as could be seen by the proceedings instituted in Belgium against a number of
Belgian nationals in which some had been convicted and others acquitted.").
264. See supra note 255 and accompanying text; see also Photos Reveal Belgian
Paratroopers' Abuse in Somalia, CNN, Apr. 17, 1997, http://edition.cnn.com/world/
9704/17/belgium.somalia/.
265. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
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implementation of other bilateral agreements to which they are a
party. Accordingly, both the ROK and the United States should
consider the legitimacy of criminal jurisdiction under the SOFA
framework in light of their obligations under human rights
treaties. Based on the discussion in Part II, the potential
incompatibility between the two treaties can be reconciled with
modest effort
from both parties.
This
Part offers
recommendations for resolving the tension between the ICCPR
and the Korea SOFA, first from the perspective of the ROK, and
then from the perspective of the United States.
With respect to the ROK, waivers of jurisdiction should only
be granted subject to a guarantee by the United States that all
steps necessary will be taken to investigate the allegations,
develop a judicial remedy, and ensure that justice will be done.
The United States should adopt a consistent practice of making
public and transparent both the investigations and the resulting
judicial process following offenses by U.S. servicemen, and
practice judicious. use of the waiver provisions. This would
effectively harmonize the Korea SOFA with the ICCPR, by
implementing criminal jurisdiction under the Korea SOFA in a
manner consistent with both state parties' obligations under the
ICCPR.
A.

Reconciling the ROK's ObligationsUnder the Korea SOFA and the
ICCPR

As a state party to the ICCPR, the ROK has an affirmative
obligation to ensure that individuals within its territory or subject
to its jurisdiction have effective remedies for rights violations
under their domestic legal system. 266 The incompatibility arises
because complying with the Korea SOFA leaves the ROK both
unable to provide legal protection for offenses committed by U.S.
military personnel in the ROK, and without any assurance that
the United States will take adequate measures to render an
267
effective remedy.
Part II.A's discussion of Professor Sadat-Akhavi's theory of
treaty conflicts is particularly instructive for the conflict between
266. See supra notes 110-22 and accompanying text (discussing the obligation of
state parties under article 2 of the ICCPR).
267. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text (identifying the conflict
between article 2 of the ICCPR and criminal jurisdiction under the Korea SOFA).
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the Korea SOFA and article 2 of the ICCPR. As mentioned, treaty
conflicts are reconcilable when the conflict is partial, that is,
when there is at least one way to comply with both sets of treaty
obligations. 268 Compliance with the Korea SOFA may sometimes,
but not always, put the ROK in breach of article 2.269 Were the
United States to commit itself to exercise due diligence in
investigating and developing a judicial remedy, the conflict
between the Korea SOFA and the ROK's obligations under
article 2 evaporates. Appraising the situation from this angle
reveals that article 2 of the ICCPR establishes certain baseline
norms, which define and limit the implementation of the Korea
SOFA. This reading captures the idea of a hierarchy of norms in
the international legal system: the ICCPR establishes legal duties
of such fundamental character that state parties are not
permitted to limit their effectiveness0 through reservations or
2 7
through inter se rules of applicability.
The examples from Europe, as well as the HRC's subsequent
practice, demonstrate how these otherwise incompatible treaty
norms can be reconciled. Obligations under human rights
treaties must be respected, and an approach similar to that
adopted in cases like Soering and Ng, where state obligations
under the controlling human rights treaty could be preserved by
obtaining adequate guarantees from the United States, can help
to address the problem. 271 Applied to this context, the ROK
should obtain adequate assurances from the United States that it
will take the appropriate measures to ensure an adequate and
effective investigation and, if necessary, pursue judicial remedies
that are responsive to the severity of the offense. Absent such
assurances, the ROK should not grant any request for a waiver of
jurisdiction to the United States. Such a practice, if adopted, also
accords with notions of equity and reciprocity; any diminishment
in U.S. sovereignty resulting from such a guarantee is matched by

268. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (discussing possible means of
understanding and reconciling treaty conflicts).
269. See supra Part I.C.3.
270. See supra notes 99-100, 228-30 and accompanying text (examining the
privileged character of human rights treaties in international law and the basic values
they safeguard).
271. See supra notes 217-18, 225-27 and accompanying text (discussing the
approaches used by European Courts and the HRC in addressing potential conflicts with
the human rights treaties).
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the ROK's own relinquishment of sovereignty when it waives
272
jurisdiction.
Aside from obtaining guarantees, the ROK should also
adopt a more assertive diplomatic position, akin to the resolution
adopted by the European Parliament with regard to
extraordinary rendition. 273 There, the European Parliament
recognized a hierarchy of norms privileging human rights
treaties, and pronounced that SOFAs would have to be
renegotiated if they impinged on human rights. Similarly, in the
event that the Korea SOFA prevents or inhibits effective
investigations by the ROK into the allegations of misconduct by
U.S. soldiers, because of either U.S. exclusive jurisdiction or U.S.
custody of the alleged perpetrator, the ROK should apply more
strenuous efforts to improve its implementation, and, where
possible, propose renegotiations of the Korea SOFA.
The developments in human rights law have brought
human rights out of the realm of legal abstraction, and they hold
increasing sway over domestic politics and international
relations. 2 74 For receiving states that are also state parties to the
ICCPR, the ICCPR embodies important guarantees not only to
their citizens, but to the rest of the international community.
Before concluding a SOFA that diminishes the legal protections
of their citizens, such receiving states should acknowledge their
human rights obligations, and seek to obtain balanced provisions
governing criminal jurisdiction. For the ROK, the guarantees
undertaken under the ICCPR represent an important
justification for seeking an equitable arrangement with the
United States, and to treat U.S. soldiers who break ROK law with
fairness, but not with indulgence.
B.

Harmonizing U.S. SOFA Policy and Human Rights Obligations

From the U.S. point of view, SOFA policy is intended to
protect U.S. forces abroad from facing unfair trials while

272. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (observing that SOFA provisions
entail a loss of sovereignty for receiving states).
273. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text (examining the development
and adoption of the formal resolution against extraordinary rendition by the European
Parliament).
274. See NOWAK, supra note 98, at XXXIX (noting that human rights have become
a significant factor in determining international relations).
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stationed overseas. But this goal should not come at the cost of
compromising the legal protections of the communities that
come into contact with the U.S. soldier abroad. The problems
with the Korea SOFA lie not with its terms per se, but rather with
its implementation: the policy to maximize jurisdiction produces
results that are incompatible with the object and purpose of the
ICCPR.275 Maximizing jurisdiction, however, is by no means the
only way the United States can implement criminal jurisdiction
under the Korea SOFA. Both normative and instrumental
reasons exist for why the U.S. policy of maximizing jurisdiction
should be minimized. This section will discuss them in turn.
1.

Normative Justifications

The ICCPR, like other human rights treaties, embodies
fundamental transnational norms that represent an evolution in
international law, a development that privileges the rights of
individuals over the rights of sovereigns. 276 This doctrinal shift
can be described as a move away from pure state consent, to
transnational norms that guarantee individual rights through the
universal rule of law.2 77 Therefore, the obligations imposed by
article 2 under international law establish a normative baseline,
278
one that states may not modify by bilateral agreement.
Agreements like the Korea SOFA undermine the obligation erga
omnes in the covenant's preamble because it hinders the ROK's
279 It
ability to ensure the rights recognized within the ICCPR.
follows that the United States has an interest in the ROK's

275. SeeJung & Hwang, supra note 35, at 1143 (portending that the real problems
with the Korea SOFA lie with its application rather than with its provisions).
276. See supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text (tracing the transformation in
international law ushered in by evolving philosophical notions of the relation of persons
with sovereign states, and the development of a new legal regime implementing new
ideas about human rights).
277. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (discussing the momentum of
human rights law and its growing viability as a check on pure state consent in the
international system).
278. See supra notes 99-100, 195-96 and accompanying text (analyzing the legal
implications of a hierarchy of norms, and contending that human lights should occupy
a privileged position in international law).
279. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text (examining the transnational
values enshrined within the ICCPR and its multilateral contractual aspect).
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performance of its obligations under article 2, and should refrain
280
from positions that would stymie their fulfillment.
Part I.B examined how the prevailing interpretation of
article 2 meant that it applied extraterritorially, and how its
obligations apply to the actions of U.S. instrumentalities overseas.
If the disjunctive reading imposes a legal obligation on the
extraterritorial acts of the United States, then a similar obligation
28 1
runs to the actions of U.S. military personnel serving in Korea.
In this regard, article 2 imposes a positive duty to maintain
transparency and accountability in all aspects of a state party's
judicial system, including the military justice system, and to
develop the priority of judicial remedies over merely
administrative or disciplinary sanctions, especially for serious
violations such as those against the right to life. 282 To the extent
that the U.S. policy of maximum jurisdiction is a valid exercise of
state power, it should continue to respect these minimum
requirements by providing for impartial and transparent
procedures that ensures a proper and just disposition for such
cases. A violation of those covenant rights under article 2 could
be imputed to the United States, as a result of a failure to
properly investigate, punish or provide appropriate redress for
283
such violations.
The case of the Belgian peacekeepers is also instructive for
instances where the United States obtains primary jurisdiction
through a waiver, or exercises exclusive jurisdiction. At the time,
Somalia had no functioning government or judiciary. 284 As such,
Belgium was the only state party with jurisdiction over the
Belgian perpetrators and the ability to secure the covenant rights

280. Such a policy could also violate the customary international law of treaties
codified in VCLT article 18. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 242-53 and accompanying text; see also HENKIN ET AL., supra
note 93, at 315 ("Where a state is obligated, by treaty or customary law, to respect the
human rights of an individual, the state is responsible for acts or omissions by any of its
officials or by others acting 'under color of law.'").
282. See supra notes 76-78, 115-22 and accompanying text (discussing how the
United States regularly fails to impose adequate punishment for misconduct by U.S.
soldiers serving abroad, and examining the jurisprudence of the HRC regarding the
proper implementation of state obligations under article 2 of the ICCPR.
283. See supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text (arguing that the ICCPR
imposes obligations for the U.S. failure to take adequate measures to vindicate rights
violated by U.S. soldiers abroad).
284. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
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of Somali nationals. This de facto situation is analogous to when
the ROK waives jurisdiction over crimes committed by U.S.
personnel, or when the United States has exclusive jurisdiction
(as in an official duty case). In both instances, the United States
is the only state party capable of securing the covenant rights of
ROK nationals affected by such crimes, because the ROK no
longer has jurisdiction over the perpetrators. 285 Faced with this
quandary, it is incumbent upon the United States to meet the
standards set out in article 2(3) with regard to investigation,
bringing perpetrators to justice, and respecting the priority of
28 6
judicial remedies.
It should be noted that the obligations imposed by the
ICCPR in this context are congruent with the underlying purpose
of a SOFA-to ensure that justice is done when U.S. soldiers
commit offenses overseas, while also guaranteeing their
constitutional rights. Serge Lazareff, in his authoritative work on
SOFAs, had this to say about the framework of concurrent
criminal jurisdiction:
It certainly was not the objective of the SOFA to create a
situation which would result in a denial of justice .... It is
contrary to the spirit of SOFA, which has as its objective, as
we have seen, the prompt and equitable disposition of
criminal charges, and it is contrary to the general principles
ofjustice which would require that a case be fully heard. This
requirement for some sort of hearing, other than purely
administrative, and, in the absence thereof, the return of
jurisdiction to the State formerly having the primary right is
28 7
in our opinion the most important change to be made.

285. Although article 2 is read disjunctively, state parties are not responsible for
violations of the covenant by persons who are on their territory but not subject to their
jurisdiction, for example, actions by international organizations against their own
officials (as in the case of U.N. officials), or actions by occupation troops. See NOWAK,
supra note 98, at 43. This is analogous to the de facto situation faced by the ROK under
the Korea SOFA, when the ROK either waives jurisdiction, or the committed offense
falls within the official duty exception-in both instances, the ROK has no jurisdiction
over the U.S. soldier.
286. See supra notes 115-18, 249-50 and accompanying text (identifying state
obligations under article 2(3) of the ICCPR and discussing the transnational reach of
the obligation to bring tojustice perpetrators of fights violations).
287. Lazareff, supra note 70, at 264-65.
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While his recommendation was never implemented,
Lazareff's insight remains as true today as when he was writing in
1971, whether in the ROK, Iraq, or the United States.
2.

Instrumental Justifications

Aside from the breach of international law that may result
from the current implementation of the Korea SOFA, there are
also instrumental reasons for exercising restraint in the use of the
waiver and official duty exceptions. The experience in the ROK
demonstrates that an asymmetrical implementation of such
SOFA provisions will inevitably inflame local sensibilities and
damage political relations.2 88 As the United States advances its
agenda around the world, whether in the ROK or in Iraq, the
perception of the U.S. soldier being above the law will only make
long-term deployments more difficult to sustain.
There is evidence that the maximization policy has
produced a complacent attitude in military commanders, who
fail to appreciate the infringement on sovereignty that a request
for a waiver of jurisdiction entails. 289 While this policy may
promote consistent military discipline among U.S. forces without
interference from receiving states, such a rationale is sound only
when U.S. military authorities impose punishments proportional
to the offenses committed. Anything less will intensify local
resentment and undermine the legitimacy of the U.S. military
presence, producing an environment that could fuel either street
protests in the RO, 2 90 or an insurgency movement in Iraq. In
fact, rule of law operations and programs to discourage violence
by U.S. soldiers against the local population have become an
important component of the counterinsurgency strategy in
1
Iraq. 29
These are compelling reasons to adopt a more reasoned
policy regarding foreign criminal jurisdiction, and to institute
procedures that offer greater transparency and accountability in
288. See supra notes 158-77 and accompanying text (tracing the impact of the
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the Korea SOFA on both the local community and
U.S.-ROK relations).
289. See Ruppert, supra note 57, at 45-46.
290. See supra notes 158, 166, 169 and accompanying text (describing the
minesweeper accident of 2002 that left two girls dead in the ROK and the ensuing
public protests and fallout on U.S.-ROK ties).
291. SeeWexler, supra note 20, at 81-82.
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proceedings adopted against U.S. soldiers who commit crimes
abroad. The push to maximize jurisdiction arose from U.S.
Senate concerns about the due process rights of U.S. soldiers
who face prosecution abroad, 292 but numerous safeguards that
track U.S. constitutional due process requirements are present in
293
major SOFAs like the NATO SOFA and the ROK SOFA.
Moreover, as one U.S. Air Force lawyer argues, "a more reasoned
policy avoids being asked embarrassing questions about the basis
of U.S. jurisdiction and why serious cases merit only
administrative sanctions." 294 A policy adopting the judicious use
of the waiver request provision will convey to receiving states that
the United States is sensitive to their sovereign rights, promote
an image of the United States as a responsible partner, and
bolster the legitimacy of U.S. forces abroad.
CONCLUSION
The problems with criminal jurisdiction under the Korea
SOFA deserve scrutiny; they have important ramifications for the
long term implementation of such agreements elsewhere, given
the long history of the U.S. military presence in the ROK, and
the continuous efforts to amend the agreement and to improve
its implementation. The U.S. presence in the ROK has been
compared with the current engagement in Iraq, with former U.S.
President George W. Bush admitting to having considered a
"Korea Model" for the ongoing campaign in Iraq.295 Whether in
the ROK, in Iraq, or elsewhere, U.S. soldiers who commit crimes
against the local population are the exception rather than the
norm. Nonetheless, the sheer number of U.S. soldiers deployed
overseas means that even a minute fraction of "bad-hats"
translates to a large number of offenses. The problem this poses

292. See supra notes 59, 81 and accompanying text (highlighting the original
Senate justification and rationale for the policy on maximizing jurisdiction in SOFAs).
293. See Ruppert, supra note 57, at 44.

294. Id. at 45.
295. See David E. Sanger, With Korea as Model, Bush Team Ponders Long Support Role

in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 3, 2007, at Al (noting that President Bush had expressed
interest in the "Korea model"); Steve Holland, Bush Envisions United States Presence in

Iraq like S.Korea, REUTERS, May 30, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSN3041621320070530 (citing then-White House spokesman Tony Snow that Bush
would like to see a U.S. role in Iraq ultimately similar to the ROK).
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for the host community warrants further study from a human
rights point of view.
Overlaying the obligations of the ICCPR on the problem of
criminal jurisdiction under SOFAs helps sharpen the legal duties
of both receiving and sending states into focus. Article 2 of the
ICCPR imposes fundamental duties that cannot be modified by
bilateral agreement, and institutes a normative baseline that all
state parties must respect, whether they are a receiving or a
sending state. In the case of the Korea SOFA, the ROK should
maintain its current efforts to improve the implementation of the
agreement and exercise greater discretion in granting requests
for jurisdiction waiver. Such efforts will ensure that the ROK has
taken the best possible measures to bring its SOFA obligations
into conformity with the fundamental norms in the ICCPR that it
undertook to respect.
By the same token, the United States has important
normative aspirations to achieve, and treaty obligations to fulfill.
As the most influential member of the international community,
the United States has a critical role in promoting the universal
rule of law. U.S. policies provide examples for its allies, or fodder
for its enemies. When implementing SOFA agreements around
the world, the United States should refrain from any policy
insinuating that the rule of law applies only when it decides to
apply it. The United States should be sensitive to the
infringements of sovereignty that SOFAs represent, and aim for
an implementation of the criminal jurisdiction framework that
preserves a receiving state's obligations under article 2 of the
ICCPR. To the extent that the implementation of SOFAs impede
the effectiveness of human rights treaties, the United States
should pay due respect to the human rights obligations of the
receiving state, as well as its own.
AS the United States pursues a foreign policy aimed at
fostering freedom and democracy around the world, it is
imperative that the boots on the ground are not above the law.
Developments in human rights and the global rule of law
continue to gain momentum, and SOFA practice should change
to accommodate the growing recognition of the rights of persons
in international law. The United States should make all
reasonable efforts to ensure that, whenever a U.S. soldier
deployed overseas commits a criminal offense, the rights of
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affected individuals are vindicated in every instance, and not just
when they become too politically costly to ignore. Some conflicts
can be resolved, but double standards simply cannot be
reconciled with the promise of universal human rights.

Notes & Observations

